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Abstract
Three Essays in Healthcare Economics and Policy Analysis
Tuyen Pham
This dissertation research consists of three essays on healthcare economics and policy
analysis. Chapter 1 investigates and explains the failure of a proposition on limiting
dialysis clinic profits in California in 2018. The proposition would have required dialysis
clinics to issue refunds to patients or their payers for revenue that exceeds 115% of the
direct cost of treatment. In this chapter, a conceptual framework of how voters weigh
costs and benefits is developed and two different empirical approaches, simple OLS and
Double Post LASSO, are employed to identify key determinants of the voting outcome.
The empirical results suggest that counties with the presence of the giant dialysis chain,
DaVita, are 5% less likely to support the proposition.
Chapter 2 estimates the effect of retirement on weight change and prevalence to obesity
among different groups of people using 13 waves of Health and Retirement survey data
(RAND HRS) from 1992 to 2016. Retirees and working people are very different in
their characteristics, especially, physical health. Retirees normally have poorer health
outcomes compared to working people due to age and health conditions. Thus, possible
selection bias and confounding bias need to be addressed when examining the causal
effect of retirement on weight outcomes and prevalence to obesity. Fuzzy Regression
Discontinuity Design (Fuzzy RDD) and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) approaches are
employed in this chapter to overcome the bias issues. The results suggest that retirement
does not have a significant effect on weight outcomes when controlling for selection and
confounding biases.
Chapter 3 studies the impact of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on the labor market.
The major healthcare reform sparks a debate on whether it could harm employment.
The most controversial policy in the ACA is its employer mandate, which requires all
employers with 50 or more full-time employees to provide their workers health insurance
benefits. The new mandate was predicted to cause a decline in labor demand, hence, put
workers into unemployment or involuntary part-time employment. The ACA’s Medicaid
expansion was also predicted to cause a decline in labor demand. In this chapter, I use
pre-ACA regional uninsured rate as approximation for the region’s degree of exposure
the ACA and find that the ACA has positive impact on employment, specially for small
businesses, without major obstruction to the country’s business structure.
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Chapter 1
California Voters Reject the “Fair
Pricing” for the Dialysis Act
1.1

Introduction

The public choice literature divides the electorate into two categories of voters: informed
and uninformed. Voters who know the policy position of a candidate or a proposition are
considered informed, while voters who do not know those positions and are influenced
by campaign expenditures are considered uninformed (Baron, 1994). In this paper, we
contribute to the discussion about uninformed voters by examining whether largely heterogeneous funded campaigns impact voting outcomes considering the 2018 California
Preposition 8 in limiting dialysis clinics’ revenue.
Pro-profit dialysis clinics in the US are known for the elevated treatment cost, and
usually low-quality treatment.1 In November of 2018, the Service Employees International Union–United Healthcare Workers (SEIUUHW) sponsored the ballot Proposition
8 in order to limit dialysis clinics’ revenue and protect patients from poor-quality care.
The proposition requires that private and for-profit dialysis clinics to refund to patients
1

See
https://www.usnews.com/news/health-news/articles/2021-06-09/
medicares-penalties-for-poor-quality-dialysis-centers-arent-helping-study,
January
25th, 2022.

1

or patients’ payers for revenue above 115% of the costs of direct patient care and healthcare improvements. This means, if clinics want to keep higher dollar amount of profit
under the new law, they need to invest more in direct patient care and healthcare improvement including training, specialists’ wages, medical supply, maintenance, equipment, new
technology, and patient education and consulting. Hence, supporters of the proposition
believed that the law will force clinics to improve the quality of their healthcare.
In the face of having limited profit cap, dialysis companies, such as Davita and FMC
heavily invested on advertising against it relative to support groups. They argued that
the proposed law would put clinics at risk of closing, thus, reduce access to healthcare
for all patients with severe kidney diseases. The dialysis companies contributed almost
six times more than supporters of the proposition. The voting outcome favored dialysis
companies, with an overturn of 59.93% of votes to reject the proposition. In this case, we
assume informed voters are people who understand the real benefits of having the new law
passed and uninformed voters are people who are easily persuaded by the dialysis giants’
heavily funded campaigns and advertisement, who already made high profit margins.
The event of a largely heterogeneous funding campaign for California Proposition 8 in
2018 presents a unique opportunity to test the hypothesis that counties with DaVita and
FMC clinics were less likely to support Proposition 8 because uninformed voters in these
counties may have been exposed to more advertising against the proposition.
According to Strömberg (2001), advertising (via mass media) can influence voting
through at least three channels. First, politicians can convey their promises and beliefs
to a forward-looking electorate. Second, advertising can inform voters about politicians’
actions that are not directly observable. Third, the media may influence policy by influencing the weight voters put on different issues. In the case of Proposition 8, the
third channel may have been most significant since supporters and opponents were able
to communicate possible outcomes of approving or rejecting the proposition; hence, it
largely impacted uninformed voters. As suggested by Roberts (1992), the media might
not only tell voters what to think about, but also influence what actions they take based
2

on those thoughts.
Since the media can influence how voters vote, it is crucial to understand the impact of
funded campaigns in shaping voting outcomes. Yet, the empirical literature on the impact
of advertising on voting finds conflicting results. The classic study by Lazarsfeld et al.
(1944) suggests that advertising via mass media has only a small effect on voter behavior.
Similarly, Berelson et al. (1986) conclude that radio and printed newspapers have a
relative weak direct impact on voting outcomes. More recently, Coppock et al. (2020)
find that political advertising in the 2016 US presidential election campaign had a small
effect on voting. Additionally, Motta and Fowler (2016) find that advertising’s impact
on voting outcomes is conditional on the characteristics of the messages being aired and
the voters who view them. In contrast, Ferraz and Finan (2008) suggest that mass media
such as radio impact voting outcome. The authors analyze the impact of random audits
of federally transferred funds in Brazil, finding that municipalities that the local radio
presented the information had larger effect on the reelection rates of corrupt legislators.
Additionally, Chiang and Knight (2011) suggest that voters’ decisions are shaped by
information disseminated by campaigns but that the degree of influence depends on the
direction of bias. Therefore, mass media might have a larger impact on voting behavior
when campaigns reveal important and unexpected information (Strömberg, 2015).
In this study, we contribute to the literature on voting behavior in response to advertising. We use the case study of the rejected proposition on putting a cap on dialysis
clinics’ profit in California to show that the media and advertisement can influence voters’
weight on an issue and persuade them to vote against their own benefits. Our findings
highlight the importance of advertising on voting outcomes, as counties with the presence
of DaVita clinics were 5% less likely to support Proposition 8, while the presence of FMC
clinics in a county does not significantly explain voting behavior.
We proceed as follows. Section 1.2 explores rationale behind the California Preposition
8. Section 1.3 sheds light on the conceptual framework. The data are described in section
1.4. Section 1.5 presents the empirical results. Finally, the section 1.6 concludes.
3

1.2

California Proposition 8 - Limits on Dialysis Clinics’ Revenue and Required Refunds Initiative

Chronic kidney disease (CKD) is an under-recognized public health problem. It affects
more than thirty-seven million people in the United States (US) and is the ninth leading
cause of death in the country (National Kidney Foundation, 2020). If left untreated,
CKD can evolve into end-stage renal disease (ESRD). At this stage, patients’ kidneys are
not capable of removing the body’s liquid such as salt and wastes, so they need either
a kidney transplant or dialysis. While transplants might enable a better and longer life,
in 2017 less than 20% of ESRD patients received a kidney transplant, making dialysis2 a
crucial treatment for those in need (National Kidney Foundation, 2020).
ESRD patients need to have dialysis their whole lives, and the treatment is expensive.
According to United States Renal Data System’s (USRDS) annual report in 2018, the
yearly average cost of dialysis ranges from $76,177 to $90,971 per person (USRDS, 2020a).
As of 2018, over seven hundred thousand Americans were being treated for kidney failure, including those who received kidney transplants (Sullivan and Stern, 2018). Medicare
covers most of the cost of dialysis. In 2018 it spent $35.4 billion on fee-for-service expenditures on patients with ESRD, which accounts for over 7% of all Medicare expenditures
(USRDS, 2020a). In California, the estimated average cost of a dialysis treatment is
$250 per person with Medicare and $1,000 or more per person with commercial insurance
providers (Firozi, 2018).
Even though the cost of the life-saving treatment is high and for-profit dialysis companies make billions of dollars in profit, its quality is usually poor. According to data
released by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in 2019, the national average
rating of dialysis centers’ care quality is 3.9 out of 5, while the California rating (3.67)
2

There are two types of dialysis: hemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis. The length of each treatment
depends on circumstances such as how much waste is in patients’ bodies and how big they are. On
average, treatments last four hours and occur three times per week (National Kidney Foundation, 2020).
According to the National Kidney Foundation (2020), the average life expectancy on dialysis is five to
thirty years depending on patients’ condition and how well they follow the treatment.

4

is below national average. Additionally, for-profit clinics appear to perform worse than
nonprofit clinics. Zhang et al. (2010) find that dialysis clinics with a large chain status independently associated with higher mortality rate after controlling for sociodemographic
risk factors, patient disease severity, co-morbid conditions, and facility characteristics.
According to Zhang et al. (2010)’s results, patients at for-profit facilities also had 13%
higher mortality compared to patients at nonprofit facilities.
In the face of the high-cost and low-quality treatment, in November 2018 California
put on the ballot Proposition 8: The Limits on Dialysis Clinics’ Revenue and Required
Refunds Initiative. The measure had three key provisions: (1) limiting dialysis clinics’
profits to 15% and refunding profits above the limit to patients or patients’ payers; (2)
requiring clinics to submit an annual report to the state government; and (3) prohibiting
clinics from refusing to treat patients based on the source of payment. In general, the
bill was intended to protect patients from poor-quality care and being overcharged by
private dialysis clinics.
Supporters argued that Proposition 8 would improve the quality of dialysis by forcing
private dialysis clinics to dedicate a higher percentage of their revenues to patient care
and healthcare improvement including training, specialists’ wages, medical supply, maintenance, equipment, new technology, and patient education and consulting. Since 9 out
of 10 Americans with kidney failure have Medicare, which pays 80% of the treatment’s
cost, the proposed law would lower the cost burden on Medicare. According to American
Kidney Fund (2022), patients with kidney failure in the US without Medicare or Medicaid are covered by private insurance through employers or Affordable Care Act health
insurance marketplace. Supporters also argue that by putting a cap on clinics’ revenue, it
would reduce excessive charges to private insurance companies, thus lowering premiums
for all Californians. Opponents, including dialysis providers and their employees, argued
that Proposition 8 would put dialysis clinics at risk of closing and thus reduce patient
access to the treatment and put the lives of ESRD patients at risk.
Though the purpose of the proposition was to protect dialysis patients from poor5

quality service and to protect their payers from being overcharged by private dialysis
clinics, the measure was defeated. According to California’s secretary of state, 59.93% of
votes reject the proposition. The committees in support of and opposition to Proposition
8 together raised more than $130 million, making the ballot measure the most expensive
of the year. More than $111 million was raised by the opposition, with more than 88%
of that figure coming from two dialysis companies: DaVita (59%) and Fresenius Medical
Care North America (FMC) (29%). Together the companies operate more than 67% of
all clinics in the state, with 316 operated by DaVita and 132 by FMC. Every year, these
private clinics make billions of dollars in pretax profit, with a profit margin between 18
and 19% (Hiltzik, 2020).

1.3

Conceptual Framework

If Proposition 8 had been enacted, there would be two main potential benefits. The first
potential benefit is improvement in quality of care. If clinics had wanted to keep a bigger
portion of their revenue, they would have had to invest more money in direct patient
care, which leads to better sanitation, better hygiene, and a lower infection rate. The
second potential benefit is that service payers could avoid excessive charges from private
clinics. We argue that since the cost of dialysis treatments is mainly paid by Medicare,
Medi-Cal, and private insurance companies, the first benefit would have directly affected
individual voters, while the lower costs would have benefited payers more than patients
in most cases.
While $19 million was contributed to the supporting committees during the campaign,
more than $111 million was contributed to the opposition committees, mainly from big
dialysis providers.3 The two dialysis giants, DaVita and FMC, who together run nearly
67 percent of all dialysis clinics in California, contributed more than $101 million. Of
that $101 million, more than $67 million came from DaVita; the other $34 million came
3

According to Ballotpedia.org, “California Proposition 8.”
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from FMC. During the campaign, the pair put out ads arguing that if the proposition was
passed by voters, clinics would be at risk of closing. Therefore, when making their voting
decision, voters were confronted with the resulting cost of reduced access to lifesaving
treatments.
When voters choose between two alternatives, they weigh the costs and benefits to
themselves. If the benefit of passing Proposition 8 is bigger than the cost, voters will be
more likely to vote yes; otherwise, they will vote no. Voters weigh improved health care
against the cost of losing access to the treatment.
Bi = probhaving ESRD × b
Ci = (probreducing access × c × probhaving ESRD )b
Ui = Bi − Ci = Ui (probhaving ESRD , probreducing access )b

Let b be each ESRD patient’s direct benefit (the improvement in patient care) if
Proposition 8 is passed. Voter i’s benefit is Bi . The benefit is determined by an individual’s susceptibility to ESRD. When the probability of getting ESRD is higher, the benefit
of Proposition 8 is higher.
Let c be each ESRD patient’s direct cost (the reduction in access to care) if Proposition
8 is passed. Voter i’s cost from the passage of Proposition 8 is Ci . The cost to the voter
increases with the odds of getting ESRD and the probability of clinic closures.
Assume the costs and benefits for all ESRD patients are the same, which means b and
c are constant.
Let Ui be voter i’s utility, which is the benefit minus the cost. Since b and c are
constant, Ui is a function of the probability of having ESRD and the probability of clinic
closures. The factors that impact these probabilities also impact voters’ utility and hence
the voting outcome.
During the campaign for Proposition 8, FMC and DaVita spent over $100 million on
advertising the message that the proposition would put their clinics at risk of closing.
We argue that the existence of FMC and DaVita clinics in a county increases people’s
7

access to campaign advertising by these companies and hence increases voters’ expected
cost of losing access to treatment. Therefore, the existence of FMC or DaVita clinics in
a county is expected to reduce the number of yes votes.
Since the probability of getting ESRD increases voters’ cost and benefits alike, we do
not know whether the net effect of that variable is negative or positive. However, since
dialysis is a lifesaving treatment, losing access to care seriously harms patients’ health.
We argue that the cost c is much bigger than the benefit b. Therefore, the net effect is
expected to be negative. This hypothesis can be tested in our empirical approach.

1.4

Data

We use three different data sets. The first is voting-outcome data from California’s
Secretary of State (California Secretary of State, 2018). The data set reports the numbers
of voters, the number of yes votes, and the number of no votes by county.
The second data set is Dialysis Facilities in the United States (The Centers for Medicare Medicaid Services, 2018). It provides a list of all dialysis clinics in California that
registered with Medicare and includes the facilities’ names, addresses, chain organization,
and services provided. From these data, we calculate the number of clinics in each county,
whether FMC clinics or DaVita clinics are in operation in that county, and the number
of FMC clinics and DaVita clinics.
The third data set is California’s 2018 County Health Rankings report (University of
Wisconsin Population Health Institute, 2018). The data provides counties’ demographic
and economic characteristics. The data also reports different health outcomes by county.
After merging the three data sets by county, we get the final data for analysis. The
final data shows that there is at least one DaVita clinic in 60 percent of all counties
in California. FMC clinics are present in 30 percent of all Californian counties. On
average, there are five DaVita clinics and two FMC clinics in each county. Table 1.1
shows the descriptive statistics from the final data. On average, there are 11.4 dialysis
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clinics located in each county in California and the majority of them are for profit clinics
(Table 1.1). DaVita and FMC are the state’s largest for porfit dialysis chains. DaVita
clinics appears in 60% of all Californian counties with the average of 5.4 clinics with per
county. FMC clinics appears in 30% of all Californian counties with the average of 2.3
clinics per county (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic

Mean

Yes
0.4
No
0.6
DaVita
0.6
FMC
0.3
60,930.10
Household Income ($)
% under 18
22.2
% over 65
17
% Black
3
% Native
3.1
% Asian
7.7
% Hispanic
30.4
% White
54.5
% Non English
6.9
% female
49.5
% rural
28.7
% diabetes
8.7
% obesity
24.2
# of facilities
11.4
# of stations
228.5
# of DaVita clinics
5.4
# of FMC clinics
2.3
# of for profit clinics
10
# of not for profit clinics 1.5
Numbers of observations N = 58.

1.5
1.5.1

St. Dev.

Min

Max

0.1
0.1
0.5
0.5
18,000.90
4.2
5.1
3
3.3
8.6
18
19.8
4.9
2.1
28.9
1.1
3.6
25.9
572.8
11.3
5.6
24.3
2.6

0.3
0.4
0
0
38,727
14
9.7
0.1
0.8
0.6
7.3
11.1
1
37.7
0
7
18
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.6
0.7
1
1
110,843
31
28.8
13.8
22
36.5
83.8
85.4
21
51.7
100
11
33
184
4,129
77
33
175
14

Empirical Approaches
OLS Approach and Results

In our first empirical approach, we use simple OLS to test the theoretical model. Our
dependent variable is the percentage of yes votes in each county. Our independent vari9

ables are the factors that affect a county’s kidney-disease incidence and the probability
of a CKD clinic closure.
Since DaVita and FMC spent millions of dollars on advertising the message that they
would close their clinics if they were no longer profitable, the presence and number of
clinics run by these two big chains in each county might cause voters in these counties
(relative to those in counties with no FMC or DaVita clinics) to think that the probability of clinic closure is much higher. Hence, our independent variables include dummy
variables that indicate whether there are any DaVita or FMC clinics in a county and the
number of clinics run by these two chains. We include the numbers of dialysis clinics
and dialysis stations in each county in our models because they might also affect voting
behavior.
We do not have county data on the incidence of CKD. However, since people with
obesity and diabetes are more likely to develop kidney diseases than others are, we use
counties’ incidence of obesity and diabetes as indicators for prevalence of kidney diseases.
On average, the prevalence to obesity and diabetes in California in 2018 were 24.2% and
8.7%, respectively. We also control for other economic and demographic characteristics
such as household income and the racial composition of each county.
The primary results for this OLS approach are reported in table 2. Column 1 reports
results from model 1, which includes dummy variables for the existence of DaVita and
FMC clinics and also includes the total number of clinics and dialysis stations in each
county. Model 2, reported in column 2, includes the numbers of DaVita and FMC clinics
in each county. Column 3 shows results for model 3, which includes counties’ incidence of
obesity and diabetes. Lastly, in column 4, we include controls for the percentage of the
population with a high school or college degree (or both) and for the number of clinics per
one hundred thousand people. All four models control for demographic characteristics
and economic characteristics such as county level education attainment, mean household
income, and racial composition.
We find that the presence of DaVita clinics in a county predicts 5 percent fewer yes
10

votes. The presence of FMC clinics in a county does not affect the voting outcome. The
findings are consistent with our conceptual framework. If DaVita clinics are present in
a county, voters in that county fear that they will lose access to their care if DaVita
closes their clinics when Proposition 8 is passed. In model 3, we also find that a 1
percent increase in the incidence of obesity in a county decreases the number of yes votes
by 0.6 percent. This supports our hypothesis that ESRD incidence has a net negative
effect. However, when controlling for education in model 4, this small negative effect
from incidence of obesity becomes insignificant. This suggests a correlation between a
county’s level of education attainment and its incidence to obesity.
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Table 1.2: OLS Estimation
Percentage of voting in favor

DaVita
FMC
# of all facilities
# of all stations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-5.45**
(2.15)
1.88
(1.94)
0.39
(0.67)
-0.02
(0.03)

-5.08**
(2.31)
3.31
(2.23)
0.51
(0.73)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.21
(0.41)
-0.16
(0.35)

-4.82**
(2.28)
3.24
(2.23)
0.56
(0.71)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.12
(0.41)
-0.41
(0.36)

1.41***
(0.48)
-0.11**
(0.05)

1.40***
(0.49)
-1.0*
(0.05)

-0.60*
(0.36)
-0.98
(0.95)
1.2**
(0.49)
-0.07
(0.06)

-5.43**
(2.68)
2.25
(2.21)
0.71
(0.75)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.16
(0.41)
-0.45
(0.36)
-0.03
(0.06)
0.17
(0.18)
-0.58
(1.04)
-0.46
(0.37)
-0.67
(1.01)
1.20**
(0.51)
-0.13*
(0.07)

58
0.58
0.47
5.21

58
0.58
0.45
4.33

58
0.62
0.48
4.26

58
0.64
0.46
3.5

# of DaVita clinics
# of FMC clinics
% Highschool degree
% College degree
# of facilities per 100,000 population
% Obese
% Diabetes
% Not proficiency in English
% Rural
Observations
R Squared
Adjusted R Squared
F statistic
Note; ∗ p<0.1;

1.5.2

∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01.

Post-Lasso Approach and Results

Post-Lasso approach
Economic theory and intuition guide our variable selections. In particular, general utilitarian theory and median voters’ characteristics could explain voting on Proposition
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8. However, we do not observe exact data-generating processes. Failure to adequately
control for unobservable variables can lead to endogeneity due to omitted variable bias.
However, overcontrolling leads to a loss of efficiency of estimates. A standard strategy is
to report the estimates implementing different sets of controls and show that treatment
effects are unresponsive to changes in controls.
Causal interpretation relies on the assumption that there are no higher-order terms
of the control variables, no interaction terms, and no additional excluded variables that
are associated with both the treatment variable and the outcome variable. Thus, controlling for a large set of variables seems desirable to make this assumption more plausible.
However, naively controlling for the redundant variables reduces the ability to estimate
the impact of the variable of interest and consequently produces less precise estimates.
Moreover, if we also want control for all interactions forms and exponential forms of the
control variables, the covariate space can increase in dimension; and regression is completely infeasible when the number of covariates exceeds the number of observations. In
our case, we have a high-dimensional dataset with fifty-eight observations and 120 different variables. Under the assumption of sparsity, observables can be adequately controlled
for with the double-selection post-Lasso method proposed by Belloni et al. (2013).
The double-selection post-Lasso method comprises three steps. First, run Lasso of
the outcome variable on the list of potential control variables to select a set of predictors
for the outcome variable. Second, run Lasso of the variable of interest on the list of
possible control variables to pick a set of predictors for the variable of interest. Third,
run an OLS regression of the outcome variable on the variable of interest and the union
of the sets of regressors selected in the two Lasso runs. Then correct the inference with
the usual heteroskedasticity robust OLS standard error. The estimates of the response
of the outcome variable on the variable of interest yield a causal interpretation (Belloni
et al. (2013), Belloni et al. (2014)).
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Consider voting outcomes as a partially linear model:

yi = di α0 + g (zi ) + ξi ,

E [ξi |zi , di ] = 0

E [vi |zi ] = 0

di = m (zi ) + vi ,

where, we have a sample of i = 1, . . . , n independent observation. d is policy/treatment
variable possibly nonrandomly assigned. In our study, it is the existence of DaVita. The
α0 is the target parameter of interest which answers the portion of voting variations
due to the presence of DaVita. zi is a high-dimensional vector of other controls or
confounders. Based on the utilitarian voting framework and median voters’ theorem,
political, socio-economic and demographic features are in zi . It is plausible to define that
those features are a common cause for the existence of DaVita, and m0 ̸= 0, typically in
the case of observational studies. We use linear combinations of control terms xi = P (zi )
to approximate g (zi ) and m (zi ). The list xi = P (zi ) could be composed of many
transformations of elementary regressors zi such as B-splines, dummies, polynomials, and
various interactions. Having many controls poses a challenge of estimation and inference,
therefore, to avoid such we assume the sparsity assumption that only a few among many
variables in the zi explains voting outcomes yi .
yi = di α0 + x′ i βg0 + rgi +ξi
| {z }
g(zi )

di = x′ i βm0 + rmi +vi
{z
}
|
m(zi )

Sparsity then relates to x′ i βg0 and x′ i βm0 approximate g (zi ), and m (zi ) that requires only
a small number of non-zero coefficients to render corresponding approximation errors rgi
and rmi . An appealing method to estimate the sparse parameter from a high-dimensional
linear model is the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) introduce
by Frank and Friedman (1993) and (Tibshirani, 1996). Lasso simultaneously performs

14

model selection and coefficient estimation by minimizing the sum of squared residuals
plus a penalty term. The penalty term penalizes the size of the model through the sum
of absolute values of coefficients.
Let us define a feasible variable selection via Lasso for outcome variable and policy/treatment variable. Here, we change the notation as the outcome, and policy/treatment
variable take the following form

ỹi = xi β1 + ri + εi
| {z }
f (z̃i )

d˜i = xi β2 + mi + εi
{z
}
|
f (z̃i )

moreover, Lasso estimator is defined as the solution to:

 λ
minp En (ỹi − x̃i β1 )2 + ∥β1 ∥1
β1 ∈R
n
minp En

β2 ∈R



d˜i − x̃i β2

2 

+

λ
∥β2 ∥1
n

where, the penalty level λ is a tuning parameter to regularize/controls the degree of penalization and to guard against overfitting. We choose λ by cross-validation in prediction.
P
The ∥β∥1 = pj=1 |βj |. The kinked nature of penalty function induces β̂ to have many
zeros, thus LASSO solution feasible model selection method. The estimated coefficients
are biased towards 0; therefore, Belloni et al. (2014) suggest to run an OLS on selected
variables also known as post-LASSO or Gauss-LASSO estimator.
 
Let Iˆ1 = S β̂1 denote support or the controls selected by feasible Lasso estimator
 
β̂1 and Iˆ2 = S β̂2 denote support or the controls selected by feasible Lasso estimator
⌣

β̂2 . The post-double-selection estimator α of α0 is defined as the least squares estimator
obtained by regressing yi on di and the selected control terms xij with j ∈ Iˆ ⊇ Iˆ1 ∪ Iˆ2 :
 ⌣ ⌣
α, β =

min

α∈R,β∈Rp



En (yi − di α − x̃i β)2 : βj = 0, ∀j ∈
/ Iˆ
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Belloni et al. (2013) shows theoretical results that the estimates are unbiased and consistent as:
h

Ẽṽi2

i−1 h
i−1 h
i−1 −1/2 √ ⌣
 d
2 ˜2
2
n α − α0 → N (0, 1)
E ṽi ξi
Ẽṽi

Results from the post-Lasso approach
Table 1.3 exhibits the primary results with six different model specifications. The dependent variable is the county-level percentage of the population that voted in favor of
Proposition 8. Each model reports standard errors with HAC correction. Columns (1)
and (2) present generic Lasso selection. Columns (3) and (4) show estimates from Lasso
but imposing restricting on DaVita’s presence as the variable of interest. Columns (5)
and (6) show estimates implementing double-selection post-Lasso, where DaVita’s presence is the independent variable of interest. Figure 1 exhibits robustness for estimated
effect of DaVita’s presence on voting behavior.
Column (1) selects variables implementing generic Lasso from a nineteen-variable
dictionary. The estimates show that counties with higher shares of Asian are more likely
to vote in favor of proposition 8.
Column (2) selects variables implementing generic Lasso from a 209-variable dictionary. This dictionary variable comprises 19 contemporaneous variables, their squared
polynomials (19 more variables), and all the first-level interactions (19*18/2 = 171).
Column (2) shows that counties with more Asian people and higher percentage of people
with excess drinking behaviors are more likely to vote in favor while counties with higher
obesity rate and higher percentage of population with high school degrees are less likely
to vote in favor of the proposition
The estimates in columns (1) and (2) are explanatory only and cannot test the channel
for affecting voting behavior. We hypothesize that DaVita’s presence in a county explains
voting behavior. Since we want to capture the effect of DaVita’s presence in a county
on voting behavior, we then always restrict DaVita as the variable of interest, columns
(3) and (4). In the robustness checks, we argue that this seemingly obvious procedure
16

Table 1.3: Double Selection Post LASSO, DaVita as Variable of Interest
Percentage of voting in favor
(1)

(2)

% Asian

(4)
∗

−0.252
(4.980)
0.289∗∗
(0.127)

−3.764
(1.894)
1.938
(4.973)
0.374∗∗∗
(0.131)

−0.742∗∗
(0.292)

−0.561∗
(0.299)

DaVita
Household income

(3)

(5)
∗

−3.299
(1.752)

% Rural
% Adult obese

Constant

55.605
(58.718)

0.018∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.006∗∗∗
(0.002)
47.227∗∗∗
(3.315)

Observations
Variables
R2
Adjusted R2
F Statistic

58
L1
0.337
0.300
9.145∗∗∗

58
L2
0.428
0.407
20.596∗∗∗

% Asian × % Excess drinking
% Adult obese × % Highschool degree

28.853
(58.741)

0.020∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.005∗∗∗
(0.002)
28.250
(20.976)

58
L1
0.383
0.336
8.220∗∗∗

58
L2
0.468
0.427
11.640∗∗∗

(6)
∗∗

−5.614
(2.228)

−5.467∗∗
(2.368)

0.334∗∗∗
(0.118)
−0.063
(0.040)
−0.654∗∗∗
(0.226)

1.072
(0.667)

55.659∗∗∗
(6.228)

43.672∗∗∗
(7.763)

58
L1
0.410
0.353
7.214∗∗∗

58
L2
0.560
0.430
4.303∗∗∗

Note; ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. L1 represents set of 20 variables in which the LASSO
is performed. L2 comprises of 231 variable which includes variables of L1, their quadratic
terms, and all the feasible interactions. Estimates presented in column (1) and (2) is unconstrained Post LASSO performed using L1 and L2 variable set respectively. Estimates
presented in (3) and (4) are constrained Post LASSO (always contains DaVita) performed
using L1 and L2 variable set respectively. Estimates presented in column (5) and column
(6) are Double Selection Post LASSO performed using L1 and L2 variable set.

produces biases in the estimate.
Columns (3) and (4) show that DaVita’s presence in a county predicts about 3.76 and
3.3 percentage fewer votes in favor of Proposition 8, respectively. Columns (3) and (4)
select variables from 19- and 209-variable-selection dictionaries. The results from column
(3) and (4) also show that counties with higher prevalence to obesity are less likely to
vote ”Yes”.
Columns (5) and (6) select variables based on the double-selection post-Lasso from
19- and 209-variable-selection dictionaries. The variable selections are identical to each
other. The results from double-selection post-Lasso show that DaVita’s presence in a
county predicts about 5.46 to 5.61 percent fewer yes votes.
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Table 1.4 exhibits the primary results with four different model specifications. The
dependent variable is the county-level percentage of the population that voted in favor
of Proposition 8. Each model reports standard errors with HAC correction. Columns (1)
and (2) present generic Lasso selection with FMC’s presence as the variable of interest.
Columns (3) and (4) show estimates implementing double-selection post-Lasso, where
FMC’s presence is the independent variable of interest. Figure 2 exhibits robustness for
estimated effect of FMC’s presence on voting behavior. Table 1.4 shows that the presence
of FMC clinics in a county does not affect its’ voting behavior.
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Table 1.4: Double Selection Post LASSO, FMC as Variable of Interest
Percentage of voting in favor
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

−0.800
(2.398)
−1.959
(4.642)
−1.284∗∗∗
(0.333)
0.258
(0.291)
1.089∗∗∗
(0.308)
0.051
(0.132)
0.744∗∗∗
(0.225)
−0.120∗
(0.062)
−0.206
(0.753)
−0.026
(0.326)
−0.001
(0.058)
0.207∗
(0.123)

2.762
(2.087)

0.478
(4.252)

−1.922
(5.192)

Constant

71.561
(54.410)

Observations
Variables
R2
Adjusted R2
F Statistic

58
L1
0.655
0.562
7.107∗∗∗

FMC
Household income
% Under 18
% African American
% Native
% Asian
% Non English
% Rural
% Diabetes
% Adult obese
High school rate
% College

0.265∗
(0.143)

−0.024
(0.051)

−0.428
(0.315)

35.036∗∗∗
(1.797)

0.163
(0.125)
0.073
(1.270)
1.557
(1.042)
29.761∗∗
(14.654)

51.235∗∗∗
(6.650)

58
L2
0.030
0.013
1.751

58
L1
0.384
0.297
4.444∗∗∗

58
L2
0.457
0.297
2.852∗∗∗

FAC Dense
% Uninsured

∗

Note:

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Note; ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. L1 represents set of 20 variables in which the LASSO
is performed. L2 comprises of 231 variable which includes variables of L1, their quadratic
terms, and all the feasible interactions. Estimates presented in (3) and (4) are constrained
Post LASSO (always contains FMC) performed using L1 and L2 variable set respectively.
Estimates presented in column (5) and column (6) are Double Selection Post LASSO performed using L1 and L2 variable set.
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Robustness checks
This research suffers power loss due to the small number of observations. The obvious
choice seems to be to construct the model by selecting variables while always restricting
the variable of interest. However we show that our estimates based on the double-selection
post-Lasso [table 1.3, columns (5) and (6) and table 1.4, columns (3) and (4)] are less
likely to behave erratically. We take 80 percent of the random selection of the full-sample
data and bootstrap variables selection ten thousand times, then record the estimates
of the effect of DaVita’s presence and FMC’s presence. We then estimate the selected
model with a full sample ten thousand times and record the estimates of the impact of
DaVita’s and FMC’s presence. We perform this procedure for the estimates based on the
double-selection post-Lasso. The figures below show the bootstrapping results.
Figure 1.1: Robustness Checks of the Effect of DaVita’s Presence

(a)

(b)

Figure 1.2: Robustness Checks of the Effect of FMC’s Presence

(b)

(a)
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Figure 1 shows the density of impact of DaVita’s presence on voting behavior for the
model presented in Table 1.3, columns (4) and (6) respectively. The density of effect
of DaVita’s presence (in solid blue) is plotted against the normal distribution with the
same parameters (in dotted red) respectively. Restricting DaVita’s presence in generic
Lasso selection yields relatively biased estimates (panel a), while the double-selection
post-Lasso produces less biased and more consistent estimates (panel b). Comparison of
these plots suggests that our main estimates presented in column (6) are likely to indicate
a causal effect but do suffer low power.
Figure 2 shows the density of impact of FMC’s presence on voting behavior for the
model presented in Table 1.4, columns (2) and (4) respectively. The density of effect of
FMC’s presence (in solid blue) is plotted against the normal distribution with the same
parameters (in dotted red) respectively. Restricting FMC’s presence in generic Lasso
selection yields relatively biased estimates (panel a), while the double-selection postLasso produces less biased and more consistent estimates (panel b). Comparison of these
plots suggests that our main estimates presented in column (4) are likely to indicate a
causal effect but do suffer low power.

1.6

Conclusion

The results from our two methods are consistent with each other. They show that the
presence of DaVita clinics in a county predicts 5 percent fewer yes votes on Proposition 8.
They support the conceptual framework that the presence of DaVita clinics raises voters’
risk of losing access to dialysis treatment. Since Proposition 8 was meant to reduce the
price of dialysis treatments, which are paid by Medicare, and the benefit of having better
treatments is much lower than the cost of losing access to care, voters in counties with
DaVita clinics tended to vote to reject the cap on dialysis clinics’ revenues. Using the
case study of the proposition 8 in California in 2018, we contribute to the literature that
campaigns and advertisement can influence voters’ behavior.
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Chapter 2
The Causal Effect of Retirement on
Weight Change among US Adults
2.1

Introduction

Obesity has been recognized as a global epidemic since the 1990s. In the US, it is a
significant public health problem that costs the country billions of dollars annually in
medical expenditure. The disease is known to be associated with serious health risks
including heart disease, stroke, type 2 diabetes, and certain types of cancers (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2013). According to Finkelstein et al. (2009), the
annual medical cost for people with obesity is $1,429 higher than for people with normal
weight. In 2008, the U.S. spent $147 billion on obesity-related healthcare expenditures.
Despite the fact that obesity is a known public health problem, we have not found
effective measures to reduce it. The average obesity prevalence among U.S. adults was
42.4% in 2017-2018, which was 11.9% higher than in 1999-2000 (Hales et al., 2020). Obesity does not only affect quality of life but it also creates financial burdens on individuals
and society. While obesity is a serious public health problem, it is typically under-treated
because its adverse effects are long-term. People with obesity might not present with immediate medical needs for treatment. However, during the current pandemic of 2020,
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obesity has been identified as a major risk factor for COVID-19 complications and death.
According to the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), obesity increases
the risk of severe illnesses and triples the risk of hospitalization due to COVID-19 infection. Obesity also decreases lung capacity and impairs ventilation, therefore, increases
mortality rates.
Aging has been long recognized as a one of the biggest risks to weight related problems
(Chung et al. (2009); Eng et al. (2005); Jenkin (2004); Koh-Banerjee et al. (2004)); Lee
et al. (2004)). In general, people over 40 years old face higher prevalence to obesity
compared to younger people. Among people aged between 20 to 39, the prevalence to
obesity is 40%. The prevalence is 44.8% among middle-aged adults aged 40-59, and 42.8%
among older adults aged 60 or above. In addition to aging, people who are in their 60s
and 70s typically to go through a transition from work to retirement. This transition can
also be an important factor that contributes to weight change and prevalence to obesity
among older adults.
We still have an incomplete understanding of the causal relationship between retirement and the change in weight because retirement is not randomly assigned. People
normally coordinate their health status to their retirement decision, which makes it difficult to estimate the causal effect of retirement on health outcomes in general, and on
weight change in particular. It is important to understand whether retirement contributes
to the higher obesity risk so efforts can be made to reduce it.
Most of the previous studies show a correlation between retirement and weight change,
however, the direction of the relationship is unclear. Retirees tend to have more time
and lower budget constraints compared to when they were working. Therefore, if they
value health, they are likely to adopt more low-cost health-producing habits since they
can allocate more time to leisure activities, which might lead to weight loss and better
health, both physically and mentally. However, when retired, people might not value
health to the degree they did when they were working since their income is no longer
health-related (Godard, 2016). The loss of incentive in investing in health might cause
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retirees to decrease physical activities (Chung et al., 2008) and develop habits that can
lead to weight gain and poorer health, e.g. spend less time exercising, more time watching
TV, or consuming high calorie food.
In addition, it is challenging to estimate the causal relationship between retirement
and weight change since assignment to retirement is not random. While it is possible that
people change their habits after retirement, which leads to weight change, is also possible
that people who experience poor health due to weight gain and obesity are more likely to
retire early. Some studies show that retirement affects health outcomes (Hallberg et al.,
2015a) and the probability of being obese (Godard (2016); Chung et al. (2007); Chung
et al. (2009)). Other studies show that obesity indeed affects retirement. For example,
Cawley and Burkhauser (2008) found that total body fat is negatively correlated with
employment for some groups of people while fat-free mass is not significantly correlated
to employment in any group.
There are two main challenges when studying the causal effects of retirement on health
outcome. The first challenge is selection bias because people consider their health and
other conditions when to making retirement decisions. For example, wealthier people can
choose to retire early because they can afford to do so. Healthier people can choose to work
longer while people with poorer health may choose to retire early. In general, retirees and
workers are fundamentally different in their characteristics, including health. Thus, we
cannot simply compare the difference in weight or prevalence to obesity between retirees
and workers. The second challenge is confounding bias. This problem occurs because the
con-founder (for example, health) can either be affected by retirement or jointly influence
the retirement decision. Retirement might contribute to weight change, however, on the
other side, people with bad health who experience weight change are also likely to retire
early.
To the best of my knowledge, there are currently four papers that address the endogeneity issue between retirement and weight gain, Chung et al. (2009), Goldman et al.
(2008), Godard (2016), and Feng et al. (2020). Each of these paper use an instrumental
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variable as an exogenous shock to retirement. Chung et al. (2009) and Godard (2016)
use the early retirement age, that is, the age when people can start taking their social
benefit, as an instrumental variable to retirement. Goldman et al. (2008) use the Medicare eligibility age (age 65) as instrumental variable, and Feng et al. (2020) use legal
retirement age in China to predict retirement. The two different instrumental variables
serve the same purpose, they are both exogenous shocks that induce retirement decision.
The findings from these studies are mixed. Chung et al. (2009) applied the analysis on
the RAND HRS data from 1992 to 2002 and find that Americans, both men and women,
tend to gain weight after retirement, especially those who are already overweight. Godard
(2016) used the SHARE survey from European countries and found that retirement only
causes modest weight gain on woman. In the Godard (2016) study, retirement does not
cause weight gain among men in general but it induces the likelihood to obesity on heavier
men, who are already at risk of being obese. Feng et al. (2020) investigated weight change
among Chinese retirees using the same instrumental approach and found that retirement
only increases weight and BMI among men.
In the broader literature, existing studies show mixed evidence on how retirement
affects health outcomes and mortality. Hallberg et al. (2015a) and Bloemen (2017) find
that retirement reduces the mortality rate, Hernaes et al. (2013) find that retirement
has no effect on the mortality rate, while Kuhn et al. (2010) and Fitzpatrick and Moore
(2018) find higher mortality rates after retirement.
This study aims to estimate the causal impact of the retirement on Body Mass Index
(BMI) and prevalence to obesity among U.S. adults. To address the endogeneity issue,
I employ two different methods, a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design (Fuzzy RDD)
and Propensity Score Matching Method (PSM). Fuzzy RDD is an instrumental variable
approach, that overcomes the endogeneity issue by generating the complier average causal
effect (Local Average Treatment Effect) of retirement on weight. On the other hand, the
PSM method reduces selection bias and confounders by allowing matching people who
will retire in the next period to those who will not, but both have a similar probability
25

of being retired using observable characteristics.
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we examined the causal
effect of retirement on weight change and prevalence to obesity among American adults
using the traditional Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design on the up to date HRS
data from 1992 to 2016, which includes 7 more waves of data compared to Chung et al.
(2009)). Secondly, we employ the redesigned propensity score matching method suggested
by Lechner (2009) to study the causal effect of retirement on health outcome. Using this
redesigned PSM method, we reconstruct the data by stratifying it by years and matching
treated group to control group using past observable characteristics.

2.2

Empirical Strategies

In this study, we employ two empirical approaches to estimate the effect of retirement
on health outcomes, Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design (Fuzzy RDD) approach and
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) approach. The Fuzzy RDD approach allows us to estimate the heterogeneous effect of retirement on different groups of people. This approach
is useful to identify the groups people who are most at risk after retirement. However,
for policy making purposes, it is important to know whether retirement has any effect on
health outcomes without having to divide people into specific groups based on gender,
income, or their health status before they retire. By matching people who are similar
in pre-retirement characteristics, the PSM approach allows us to estimate the effect of
retirement on health outcomes without having to divide people into specific groups. We
employ both approaches in this study since they provide valuable insights for different
purposes.

2.2.1

Regression Discontinuity Design

We consider both selection bias and confounding bias when estimating the effect of retirement on health. Selection bias arises because retirement is not randomly assigned.
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Retirees and workers are fundamentally different in their characteristics including income,
health status, and prevalence to diseases (Table 2.1). Confounding bias exists because
health can both influences people’s retirement decisions and conversely be affected by
retirement. To address these issues, we first employ the Fuzzy RDD method. We use the
early retirement age (ERA) as an instrumental variable.
In the US, there is no federal mandatory retirement age since Congress abolished the
mandatory retirement law in 1986 by amending the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. However, at the age of 62 (early retirement age), people can start receiving their
Social Security retirement benefit (Fitzpatrick and Moore, 2018). The ERA is a good instrument variable because it is highly correlated with our variable of interest - retirement;
but ERA does not directly affect health outcomes. Even though people are not entitled
to the full benefit until they reach 67 (the full retirement age), the early retirement age
still creates an exogenous shock to retirement decisions. Figure 2.1 shows the share of
retirement by age, with a sharp increase in the probability of being retired when people
turn 62-year-old. It is important to note that there is no evidence that turning 62 increases people’s weight or their prevalence to obesity. Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 show no
discontinuous increases in BMI and prevalence to obesity, respectively, at age 62. Thus,
ERA qualifies as a valid instrumental variable.
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Figure 2.1: The Share of Retirement by Age (in month)
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Figure 2.2: Average BMI by Age (in month)
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Figure 2.3: Prevalence to Obesity by Age (in month)

However, retirement is not influenced only by age. To estimate the likelihood of
retirement, we need to identify a vector of observable covariates that might influence
an individual’s retirement decision. According to previous studies, there are several
factors that significantly contribute to the retirement decision, for example, economic
and financial conditions such as total wealth and level of pension benefit (Blöndal and
Scarpetta, 1999), health (Clark and Spengler, 1980), education (Blöndal and Scarpetta,
1999), eligibility for health insurance, and joint retirement decision between husband and
wife (Hurd, 1990). These factors affect retirement decision differently. Some factors “pull”
(positively correlated with) the retirement decision while other factors “push” (negatively
correlated with) the retirement decisions. For example, poor health and inability to find
work are factors that “push” retirement decisions, while having a retired spouse or having
no need to work due to adequate finance are factors that “pull” retirement decisions
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(Shultz et al., 1998). Among these factors, health and financial factors have been found
to be the factors that most strongly influence retirement decisions.
In stage one, we estimate the probability of being in retirement using observable
characteristics that influence the retirement decision. In stage 2, we use the predicted
probability of retirement to plausibly estimate the causal effect of retirement on BMI and
obesity.
Stage 1:

Retiredit = α0 + α1 Age62 + α2 Age + α3 Age2 + θXit + δt

(2.1)

ˆ it + β2 Age + β3 Age2 + γXit + µt
BM Iit = β0 + β1 Retired

(2.2)

ˆ it + β2 Age + β3 Age2 + γXit + µt
Obeseit = β0 + β1 Retired

(2.3)

Stage 2:

where Xit is the vector of individual i′ s observable characteristics at time t including survey participants’ age, education, health, total household wealth, level of pension
benefit, eligibility to government health insurance, marital/partner status, their spouse’s
health, spouse’s retirement status, and age difference between participants and their
spouse. BM Iit is individual i′ s BMI at time t. δt and µt are time variant fixed effects.
To find the general effects of retirement on all adults who are transitioning to retirement, we applied this estimation method on people who are aged between 55 and 71. We
also checked the heterogeneous effects of retirement on weight outcomes and prevalence
to obesity within smaller subgroups by genders and initial weight before retirement.
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2.2.2

Propensity Score Matching

To confirm the results from the fuzzy RDD approach, we employ Propensity Score Matching as the second approach to investigate the effect of retirement on weight change. Fuzzy
RDD, or instrumental variables approach has been used in previous studies (Chung et al.
(2009), Goldman et al. (2008), Godard (2016), Feng et al. (2020)). Investigators who
used this method found highly heterogenous effects of retirement on different groups of
people. These studies divide data to sup-samples by age, gender, initial weight, former
occupation, income, etc. However, while it is essential to know how retirement deferentially affects groups of people, it is not feasible to keep dividing the data into smaller
groups because the number of observations in a data set is limited. As the number of
characteristics increases, the number of observations in each sub-sample gets smaller.
The idea of dividing data into smaller subgroups is to have smaller groups that are
more similar in characteristics. Another way to achieve a treated group and a control
group with the same characteristics is employing the matching estimators (Propensity
Score Matching) method. Using this method, we construct a treated pool (retirees)
and a control pool (workers) with both pools having the same distribution of observable
characteristics. This allows the removal of the selection bias without dividing the data
into smaller groups.
Let i denotes an individual and R denotes whether the individual is retired

Ri




1 if person i is retired,

(2.4)



0 if person i is not retired
If we simply compare health outcomes between the 2 groups of people (BMI and
the likelihood of being obese), we get the difference in group mean:
1] − E[Yi |Ri = 0]
= E[Y1,i |Ri = 1] − E[Y0,i |Ri = 0]
= E[Y1,i |Ri = 1] − E[Y0,i |Ri = 1] + E[Y0,i |Ri = 1] − E[Y0,i |Ri = 0]
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= E[Yi |Ri =

= E[Y1,i |Ri = 1] − E[Y0,i |Ri = 1] + E[Y0,i |Ri = 1] − E[Y0,i |Ri = 0]
{z
} |
{z
}
|
Average causal effect

Selection bias

With
E[Y1,i |Ri = 1] = expected health outcome of people who are retired.
E[Y0,i |Ri = 1] = expected health outcome of retired people if they were working.
E[Y1,i |Ri = 1] = expected health outcome of working people.

E[Y1,i |Ri = 1] − E[Y0,i |Ri = 1] is the difference in health outcome between people who
are retired and themselves if they were working. In other words, this is the causal effect
of retirement on health outcome.
E[Y0,i |Ri = 1] − E[Y0,i |Ri = 0] is the selection bias term. It is the difference in health
outcomes between working people and themselves if they chose to retire. If retirement
were random, characteristics between treated and control groups are very similar. However, in this case where there is absence of randomization, causal effects can be estimated
by comparing 2 individuals that have the same observable characteristics, one is treated,
and one is not treated (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).
However, it is impossible to find exact control matches to treated individuals as the
number of observable characteristics gets bigger. Another method to achieve E[Y(0,i |Ri =
1] = E[Y0,i |Ri = 0] is to match treated units to control units using the conditional
probability of receiving treatment, for example, propensity scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983). According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), propensity score is the conditional
probability of receiving treatment, given a vector of oerved covariates. In this case,
propensity score is the conditional probability of being retired.
Retiredit = α0 + α1 Age62 + α2 Age + α3 Age2 + θXit + δt
ˆ it
Propensity Scoreit = Retired
By matching a treated observation to a control observation with similar probability
of being retired, we can now eliminate selection bias when comparing health outcomes
between retirees and workers. However, we need to keep in mind that simply matching
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treated observations to control observations using propensity score only removes selection
bias. This method does not remove confounding bias issues when it comes to retirement
and health outcomes because health can both influence retirement decision and be determined by retirement. In fact, after we matched the treated group to the control group
using simple propensity score matching, there are still significant differences in health
outcomes between retirees and working individuals (See Appendix, Table A). This means
we cannot conclude that health outcomes do not influence people’s retirement decision.
To tackle the confounding bias problem, Lechner (2009) suggests stratifying the data
by years and match a treated group to a control group using the “year before” characteristics. In other words, they suggest estimating propensity score using control variables
the period before the period when the retirement decision was made. For example, in
year 1992, there are n individuals who were still working. In year 1994, the working
group in 1992 divided into 2 samples, working sample and retired sample. We then estimate propensity scores for each member in the 2 samples using their characters in 1992,
when they were all working. After that, we match each treated individual with a control
counterpart, using the 1992 propensity score. Since the two groups were both working
in 1992, and have similar propensity scores in 1992, the difference in health outcomes in
1994 can only be due to their retirement status. Thus, the confounding issue is reduced.
We used the same approach for each wave from 1994 to 2016, then combine them to
create the final data for analysis. We later (in section 4.2, table 9) show that the treated
group and the control group in the final sample are much more similar with respect to
health outcomes the period before retirement. Now that the two main issues are taken
into consideration, we can estimate the plausibly causal effect of retirement on weight
and prevalence to obesity by comparing health outcomes between the treated pool and
the matched control pool. The equations estimated are given by:

BM Iit = β0 + β1 Retiredit + β2 Age + β3 Age2 + γXit + µt
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(2.5)

Obeseit = β0 + β1 Retiredit + β2 Age + β3 Age2 + γXit + µt

(2.6)

where Retiredit is a dummy variable that indicates if individual i is retired at time t.
Xit is the vector of individual i′ s relevant observable characteristics at time t. BM Iit
is individual i′ s BMI at time t. Obeseit is a dummy variable that indicates whether an
indididual i is obese at time t. µt is time variant fixed effects.

2.3
2.3.1

Data and Variables
Data

In this paper, we use the RAND HRS data, a smaller and more accessible version of the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS). RAND HRS data set is described as user-friendly
files derived from all waves HRS. The survey was conducted every 2 years. Currently
there are 13 waves of RAND HRS survey from 1992 to 2016. The survey contains demographic, health, finance, wealth, health insurance, family structure, and employment
history at individual-level. The survey follows the same 42,052 individuals across 13
waves, although, not all individuals have a 13-wave record. Some individuals entered the
survey later than the others, and there are some individuals who left the survey.
Since we focus on the effect of retirement on elderly people, who are transitioning
into retirement, observations from individuals younger than 55-year-old or older than 71year-old are removed. At the end, we have 114,688 observations from 29,093 individuals
across 13 waves. Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics from the data set after we
removed observations from individuals who are younger than 55-year-old and older than
71-year-old.
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2.3.2

Varibles

Retirement. - Self-declared retirement status is used to define retirement. People who
indicated they were fully retired when asked are considered ”retired”. People who said
they were working at the time are considered ”working”. People who said they were
partially retired and who did not answer the questions are excluded from the data. Using
this definition, 37% of all observations in the data are classified as “retired”.
Body Mass Index (BMI) and Obesity. - The dependent variable, BMI, is calculated
from self-reported weight (in kilograms) and height (in meter). People with BMI of
25kg/m2 or smaller are consider normal weight or underweight, people with BMI higher
than 25kg/m2 are considered overweight or obese, people with BMI over 30kg/m2 are
considered obese. The average BMI is 28.46kg/m2. Based on the BMI classification, 70%
of the sample are either overweight or obese, and 33% of the sample are obese. Retirees
have the average BMI of 28.72 kg/m2 while working people have the average BMI of
28.3 kg/m2. The prevalence to obesity is 34% among retirees and 31% among working
individuals.
Health status. - According to Clark and Spengler (1980), health is an important factor
that influences a worker’s productivity, hence, influences his or her market wage rate.
As an individual’s productivity and wage rate decreases, he or she might consider more
leisure time. Therefore, health plays an important role in labor market participation and
withdrawal. Individuals with more health limitations are more likely to retire compared
to those who are healthier. We use the respondent’s self-reported health as the measure
of their health condition. This measure is a 5-step categorical variable, which range from
1 for “Excellent” to 5 for “Poor”. The mean health score among retirees is 3.05/5 while
it’s 2.5/5 among working individuals. Which means retirees are generally less healthy
then working people.
Health shocks. - Health shocks are defined as major health events that occurred in
the past 2 years. Health shocks are grouped into 5 categories: cardiovascular diseases
(including heart diseases and strokes), diabetes, cancers, lung diseases, limitation in daily
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activities (including walking, dressing, bathing, eating, going to bed, and toileting). Each
health shock category is coded as a binary variable, 1 if occurred in the past 2 year, 0
otherwise. Results from table 1 shows that retirees are more likely to experience major
health shocks compared to working individuals.
Economic and financial conditions also play an important role in retirement decisions. Two financial factors that impact people’s retirement decision are their “total
wealth” and their “level of pension benefit”. If people have enough wealth or income
replacements that allow them to not need to work, they might desire more non-working
time. Shultz et al. (1998) finds that if a person does not have a need to work based on
adequate finances, he or she is more likely to retire earlier than those who need to work.
If people do not have adequate finances to retire, they can make their retirement decision
based on the level of their income replacements, for example, pension benefit. According
to Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999), in OECD countries, pension benefits discourage older
people from working because a year of working is a year of forgoing pension benefit.
Hence, the higher the level of pension benefit one receives, the more likely he or she will
retire compared to those who are eligible for less pension benefit. It would be an ideal
scenario if we have the data for both respondents’ wealth and their expected level of
pension benefits before retirement.
However, while “total wealth” is available in the HRS data, individual’s potential level
of pension benefits a year before they retire is not available, and cannot be calculated.
Even though expected pension benefit is not available, we can still use respondent’s
current working income as an approximation for their level of expected pension benefit.
In the U.S., if a person starts collecting their pension benefit at the age of 67, after at
least 10 years of work, he or she can earn from 27 percent to 75 percent of their preretirement income, depending on how much they earn before retirement (Social Security
Administration, 2019). A low earner can earn up to 75 percent of their pre-retirement
income, while a medium earner earns up to 40 percent and a high earner earns up to
27 percent. Therefore, lower earners when retired can get an income replacement very
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close to their pre-retirement income, while higher earners get only a small portion of their
working income. In other words, lower earners earn a higher “level” of pension benefit.
By higher level, we mean a higher percentage of pre-retirement income rather than dollar
amounts. Hence, higher earners are expected to delay their retirement and lower earners
are expected to retire earlier. In addition, those income replacement percentages would
be smaller if individuals start collecting their benefit earlier than the age of 67, and larger
if they start collecting their benefit after the age of 67. Therefore, people might postpone
their retirement until they turn 67. On average, retirees have bigger total wealth and
lower income compared to working people.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables
Retired
BMI (kg/m2)
Overweight
Obese
Age
Female
Education (years)
Health
Household’s capital income ($)
Total wealth ($)
Income ($)
GOV insurance
Private Insurance
Cadiovascular
Cancer
Diabetes
Lung
ADL limitation
Spouse’s health
Spouse cardiovascular
Spouse cancer
Spouse diabetes
Spouse lung
Spouse ADL limitation
N

All

Retired

Working

Difference

37%
28.46
70%
33%
60.25
56%
12.73
2.72
14,725.05
353,732.80
23,736.34
35%
71%
19%
9%
17%
8%
19%
2.67
13%
6%
11%
5%
13%

100%
28.72
71%
34%
64.4
55%
12.35
3.05
8,359.36
387,091.84
3,050.93
71%
57%
30%
13%
23%
13%
24%
2.77
16%
8%
13%
6%
12%

0%
28.3
69%
31%
57.8
56%
12.95
2.5
18,471.82
334,098.12
35,676.06
14%
79%
12%
6%
13%
5%
16%
2.61
11%
5%
10%
4%
13%

100%***
0.41 ***
1% **
0.03 ***
6.6***
1%
-0.6 ***
0.54***
-10112.5***
52993.7***
-32225.1***
57%***
-21%***
18%***
7%***
10%***
8%***
8%***
0.16
5%***
3%***
3%***
2%***
-1%***

114,688

42,493

72,195

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
* Significant at 10% level.
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2.4
2.4.1

Results
Results from RDD

First stage results
The result from the first stage shows that reaching ERA (age 62) significantly increases
the chance of retirement by 16.7% in general (Table 2.2). In addition, reaching 62-yearold does not have any significant impact on the outcome variables, weight and prevalence
to obesity (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). The share of retirement increased by age but with a
decreased rate. This result further confirms the legitimacy of the instrumental variable.
Table 2.2: First Stage Results

First Stage

Age 62
Age
Age squared
N
F-value
R-square

All
0.167 (0.005)***
0.05 (0.005)***
-0.0003
(0.00004)***
77280
1966.77
0.48

Male
0.18 (0.007)***
0.04 (0.008)***
0.0002(0.00006)***
38853
1047.22
0.49

Female
0.17 (0.007)***
0.05 (0.007)***
-0.0003
(0.00006)***
38427
1106.66
0.50

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
* Significant at 10% level.

Second stage results
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present the second stage results. Table 2.4 shows that in general,
retirement does not have an effect on the prevalence to obesity. Table 2.3 shows that
retirement does not cause any weight change among men. Among the female participants, retirement has a marginally significant impact on BMI of 1.29 kg/m2 (Table 2.3).
The number means if a woman is 1.6-meter-tall, she is likely to gain 3.3 kg because of
retirement. The effect on is significant at the 10% confidence level.
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We then evaluate the heterogeneous effects of retirement on weight and obesity by
gender, as well as weight before retirement. We divided men and women into 3 different
categories base on their weight a period before retirement. Group 1 includes individuals
who are either normal or underweight one period before retirement (BMI < 25 kg/m2).
Group 2 includes individuals who are overweight (BMI in between 25 and 30 kg/m2) one
period before retirement. Group 3 includes people who are obese (BMI ≥ 30 kg/m2) one
period before retirement.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present the effect of retirement on BMI on subgroups by genders and
pre-retirement weight. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 present the effect of retirement on prevalence
to obesity on subgroups by genders and pre-retirement weight.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show that men who are underweight or normal weight are likely
to lose weight after retirement. It shows on average, retirement causes 1.62 points lower
in men’s BMI. For example, a normal or underweight man, who is 1.7-meter-tall and
has BMI lower than 25kg/m2, is expected to lose 4.7 kg after retirement. The effect is
significant at 10% level.
Table 2.8 shows no effect of retirement on prevalence to obesity among women. However, Table 2.7 shows that retirement decreases the likelihood of being obese among men
who are already obese a period before their retirement by 0.27 percentage points.

Table 2.3: The Effect of Retirement on Weight (Fuzzy RDD)

Retired
Age
Age squared
N

Effect of retirement on BMI
All
Male
0.43 (0.45)
-0.29 (0.55)
0.09 (0.076)
-0.15 (0.1)
-0.002 (0.0006)**
0.0006 (0.0008)
77280
38853

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
* Significant at 10% level.
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Female
1.29 (0.75)*
0.33 (0.11)***
-0.004 (0.001)***
38427

Table 2.4: The Effect of Retirement on Prevalence to Obesity (Fuzzy RDD)

Retired
Age
Age squared
N

Effect of retirement on prevalence to obesity
All
Male
Female
0.016 (0.036)
-0.02 (0.05)
0.076 (0.05)
0.003 (0.006)
-0.01 (0.01)
0.02 (0.009)**
-0.00007 (0.00005) 0.0008 (0.0008)
-0.002 (0.00007)***
77280
38853
38427

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
* Significant at 10% level.

Table 2.5: The Effect of Retirement on BMI – by Initial Weight (Male)

Effect of retirement on BMI - By Initial Weight Level (Male)

Retired
Age
Age squared
N

BMI < 25
-1.62 (0.88)*
0.12 (0.25)
-0.0005 (0.002)
1501

BMI ≥ 25
-0.90 (0.87)
-0.036 (0.17)
-0.0003(0.0002)
5273

BMI ≥ 30
-1.25 (1.39)
0.33 (0.42)
-0.002 (0.003)
2022

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
* Significant at 10% level.

Table 2.6: The Effect of Retirement on BMI – by Initial Weight (Female)

Effect of retirement on BMI - By Initial Weight Level (Female)

Retired
Age
Age squared
N

BMI < 25
1.10 (1.18)
-0.49 (0.25)*
0.004 (0.002)*
2640

BMI ≥ 25
-0.12 (1.16)
0.67 (0.30)**
-0.0006(0.0002)**
4597

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
* Significant at 10% level.
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BMI ≥ 30
0.05 (2.5)
-0.17 (0.48)
0.002 (0.004)
1889

Table 2.7: The Effect of Retirement on Prevalence to Obesity – by Initial Weight (Male)
9
Effect of retirement on prevalence to obesity - By Initial Weight Level (Male)

Retired
Age
Age squared
N

BMI < 25
-0.02 (0.03)
-0.02(0.01)**
0.0002(0.00008)**
1501

BMI ≥ 25
-0.11 (0.10)
0.09(0.003)
-0.0003(0.0002)
5273

BMI ≥ 30
-0.27 (0.13)**
0.017(0.04)***
-0.001(0.0003)***
2022

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
* Significant at 10% level.

Table 2.8: The Effect of Retirement on Prevalence to Obesity – by Initial Weight
(Female)
Effect of retirement on prevalence to obesity - By Initial Weight Level (Female)

Retired
Age
Age squared
N

BMI < 25
0.06 (0.06)
-0.04(0.013)***
0.0003(0.0001)***
2640

BMI ≥ 25
0.12 (0.11)
0.048(0.029)*
-0.0005(0.0002)*
4597

BMI ≥ 30
0.07 (0.18)
0.046(0.035)
-0.0003(0.0003)
1889

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
* Significant at 10% level.

2.4.2

Results from Propensity Score Matching

After matching treated group and control group using their past characteristics one period
before retirement, there are 2,451 individuals in the treated group (retirees) across 13
waves of the HRS survey. Each retired individual in the treated group is then matched
with one control counterpart who has the most similar past characteristics. The final data
set contains 4,902 observations, half of them retired, and the other half actively working.
After matching, the difference between retirees and workers significantly decreased (Table
2.9). From the descriptive statistics, we can see that there is no significant difference in
health between retirees and workers. The main differences between retirees and workers
are income and wealth. Though the difference in income and wealth between retirees and
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workers are statistically significant, they are much smaller than the differences before
matching, and they are small enough to not be economically significant. Therefore, the
difference in health is not the main factor that drives people’s retirement decision.
Table 2.9: Descriptive Statistics after Matching Propensity Score
Variables

Working

Retired

Difference

Retired
BMI (kg/m2)
Overweight
Obese
Age
Female
Education (years)
Health
Household’s capital income
($)
Total wealth ($)
Income ($)
GOV insurance
Private Insurance
Cadiovascular
Cancer
Diabetes
Lung
ADL limitation
Spouse’s health
Spouse cardiovascular
Spouse cancer
Spouse diabetes
Spouse lung
Spouse ADL limitation

100%
27.65
67%
27%
60.8
52%
12.5
2.56
12,603.00

0%
27.69
69%
27%
60.8
50%
12.45
2.57
12,458.00

100%***
-0.04
-2%
0
0
2%
0.05
-0.01**
145***

334,336.00
29,719.00
17%
87%
15%
5.9%
11.5%
6.5%
22%
2.65
20%
8%
12%
8%
25%

331,974.00
30,330.00
17%
86%
16%
6.4%
12.0%
6.5%
22%
2.65
20%
8%
13%
8%
25%

2362***
-610**
0
1%
-1%
-0.5%**
-0.5%
0
0
0
0
0
-1%
0
0

N

2,451

2,451

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
* Significant at 10% level.
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Now it is established that the data design reduces both potential selection bias and
confounding bias, we can use the simple OLS approach to see whether there is a causal
effect of retirement on weight change and on the prevalence to obesity. Table 2.10 shows
there is no causal effect of retirement on weight change and prevalence to obesity among
US adults.
Table 2.10: The Effect of Retirement on BMI and Prevalence to Obesity (PSM)
Dependent variable:

BMI

Obese

Retired
Age
Age squared
Number of observations
R-squared

-0.09 (0.15)
-0.17(0.48)
0.0008(0.004)
4902
0.09

0.003 (0.013)
-0.06(0.04)
0.0004(0.0003)
4902
0.06

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
* Significant at 10% level.

2.5

Conclusion

The paper examines the effects of retirement on weight (BMI) and prevalence to obesity.
To overcome the confounding bias and selection bias issues when studying the causal effect
of retirement on health outcomes, two different methods are employed: fuzzy RDD, and
propensity score matching (PSM).
In general, results from fuzzy regression discontinuity design show that retirement has
no effect on weight and prevalence to obesity among the general population of American
adults. When divided into smaller subgroups, we find that retirement causes weight loss
among men who are underweight or normal weight. Retirement also causes a modest
decrease in prevalence to obesity among the group of heavier men who are already obese.
These effects are significant at 10% level.
However, the idea of dividing the data into smaller groups so that people in those
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groups are more similar in characteristics are not sustainable when the number of observable characteristics increases. To overcome this problem, we employ the redesigned
propensity score matching method suggested by Lechner (2009). This method allows
us to address the possible selection and confounding biases by creating a treated group
(retirees) and a control group (workers) with similar characteristics including health and
prevalence to major health shocks. Knowing that the control group and treated group
are similar with respect to health outcomes alleviates concerns that health jointly influences the retirement decision. Therefore, if retirement has any effect on weight change
and prevalence to obesity, it is a plausibly causal effect. After matching propensity score,
we found that retirement does not have any effect on weight change and prevalence to
obesity among American adults. The result from the PSM approach is consistent with
the results from the Fuzzy RDD approach on the full sample of US adults. The result
suggests that when the confounding and selection bias issues are addressed, retirement
does not have adverse effects on health outcomes in general. However, when pooling
people into specific groups, some groups are at higher risk of weight gain after retirement
while some other groups become healthier after retirement.
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Chapter 3
The Effects of Affordable Care Act
on Employment
3.1

Introduction

In 2010, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law. This legislation provided
for a number of important provisions affecting healthcare including: 1) the prohibition
of denying coverage on account of prior conditions, or dropping insurance coverage when
a recipient is ill; 2) equalizing premium costs across age, pre-existing conditions, and
other patient characteristics; and 3) guaranteeing coverage of certain essential services
such as ambulance, emergency services, hospitalization, preventative care, maternity and
newborn care, mental health and substance use services for everyone.
Provisions included in the Affordable Care Act are intended to protect consumers,
increase access to healthcare insurance, improve health services’ quality, expand health
workforce, and alleviate rising healthcare costs. However, critics argue that some of the
ACA’s key provisions (for example, employer mandate, Medicaid expansion, and federal
income subsidies) might negatively affect the labor market on both supply and demand
sides by giving employers disincentives to hire and workers disincentives to work. Since
the ACA went into effect nationwide in 2014, it has provided the opportunity to evaluate
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the impact of a major change in health care regulation on both the health care system as
well as the labor economy influenced by this dramatic shift in employment-based benefits.
There is evidence that the ACA has a major impact on insured rate in the country.
According to Center on Budget & Policy Priorities (2019), more than 20 million people
gained access to healthcare coverage in 2016. While half of that increase came from
Medicaid reform, the remaining half is from new private health insurance plans started as
required by the ACA patient protection and employer mandates. The Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities also reported that between 2010 and 2018, the share of non-elderly
adults with difficulty paying a medical bill fell by 17%, the share of non-elderly adults
who did not visit a provider when needing care fell by 19%, and the share of non-elderly
adults who could have been denied coverage due to preexisting conditions fell by 20% to
40%. However, there is still a gap in the literature on how the health policy reform affects
employment and business structure (for example, how ACA affects the size of businesses).
Since one of the most controversial provisions of the ACA is employer mandate for
employers with 50 more more full-time workers, the healthcare reform is expected to have
a negative impact on employment for such businesses and hence, has negative impacts on
employment as a whole. The motivation for this study is to determine the impact of the
ACA on employment across all businesses and business structure. I aim to examine how
employment has changed as the result of the ACA implementation and whether businesses
responded to the healthcare policy reform by downsizing or hiring less full-time workers
and more part-time workers.
Though the ACA was signed into law in 2010, its major provisions went into effect
in 2014. Using the states’ and counties’ uninsured rates in 2013 (the year before the
major ACA’s provisions came into effect) as an approximation for the degree of exposure
to the ACA, I find that employment growth rates were not significantly different across
states and counties pre-ACA’s implementation. After the implementation of the ACA in
2014, states and counties with higher exposure to the ACA experienced faster growth in
total employment compared to states or counties with lower exposure to the ACA. The
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growth in total employment in high exposure locations after the implementation of the
ACA came from smaller businesses of 1-99 employees. I also find that the ACA has a
positive impact on the share of full-time workers. The ACA has a small impact on the
share of small businesses of 5-9 employees, however, the effect is modest and does not
cause any major change to the business market structure.

3.2

Background and Literature Review

Under the Affordable Care Act, everyone must have health insurance provided either by
their employers, Medicare, Medicaid, or self-paid insurance. For businesses, it requires
that all businesses with 50 or more full-time employees provide minimum affordable health
insurance to at least 95% of their full-time employees and dependents up to age 26 or pay
a fee. The ACA increases the cost for labor. For example, if a firm wants to hire a 50th
full-time employee, they either have to provide health care coverage for their employees
or have to pay $68,987 in penalty (Mulligan, 2019). Either way increases their labor
costs substantially. Although millions of Americans have benefited by gaining access to
healthcare coverage through the ACA, critics of the ACA argue that it will create job loss
because it gives businesses incentives to cut workers’ hours in response to the increases
in the cost of employment.
Businesses with more than 50 full-time employees might try to avoid paying the cost
of health insurance or penalty by reducing their size to below the threshold of 50 fulltime employees. This could be achieved by either laying off full-time employees or cutting
some workers’ hours to under 30 hours per week. According to Mulligan (2019), between
28,000 and 50,000 businesses nationwide would reduce their full-time workforce to under
50 in response to the ACA’s employer mandate. This resulted in eliminating 250,000
jobs. By simulating ACA’s effects on U.S. businesses by firm size, Chow and Phillips
(2009) predict that the ACA employer mandate policy will result in the loss of over 1.6
million jobs within the first 5 years of implementation. Small firms (<500 employees) are
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the most severely affected. Job loss from small firms is expected to account for 66% of
total job loss. Chow and Phillips (2009) also predict that potential job loss from smaller
businesses with 20-99 employees might account for 26.1% of the 1.6 million job loss.
Supporters of the Affordable Care Act argued that it would not cause a decrease
in demand for labor from small and medium-sized businesses. Because businesses with
less than 50 employees are not only exempt from ACA’s employer mandate, but also
received billions of dollars in employer subsidies in the form of tax credits (Holahan and
Garret, 2011). Additionally, small businesses with less than 100 workers have the option
to purchase health insurance with a lower price through the Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP), which is estimated to save 8.7% on health insurance premium
contributions under the ACA compared to what they had to pay before the implementation of the ACA (Garrett and Buettgens, 2011). Furthermore, since 94% of medium-size
businesses - between 100 and 1000 employees - offered health insurance to their workers
in 2009, these medium-size businesses would experience little change in health insurance
coverage and would save 0.5% in premium contributions (Garrett and Buettgens, 2011).
For larger firms with more than 1000 employees, a decrease in labor demand for these
firms would be expected because of increased labor cost, yet, the negative impact of the
ACA on big firms is expected to be minimal - 0.2% of $6.4 trillion salary and wage base
(Holahan and Garret, 2011). Blumberg et al. (2012) argue that the ACA would cause a
small increase in cost for medium-sized employers of 100-1000 workers and benefit smaller
businesses, which would leave the overall cost of employment unchanged. Therefore, according to Blumberg et al. (2012), there is no evidence to support the argument that the
ACA creates burden on employers and harms overall employment.
There is mixed evidence in existing studies to support the argument that the ACA
has a negative impact on labor demand. Some early studies support the speculation.
Dillender et al. (2015) employed a difference-in-differences analysis find that the ACA
resulted in an increase in involuntary part-time employment1 in industries such as food
1

Individuals who want to work full-time, but currently work part-time because they cannot find a
full-time job
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services, retail, and accommodation. Even and Macpherson (2015) find no change in the
probability of involuntary part-time workers in 2014 but they estimate that 1 million
workers will be in involuntary part-time positions in the future because of the ACA’s
employer mandate. Other studies do not support the speculation since they did not find
any significant or meaningful change in the share of involuntary part-time workers since
the implementation of the ACA (Moriya et al. (2016), Garrett et al. (2017), Mathur et al.
(2016)).
On the supply side of the labor market, critics have argued that ACA’s Medicaid
expansion and federal income subsidies provide workers with disincentives to work. Prior
to the ACA, adults between 18 and 64 years of age qualified for Medicaid only if their
household income was below 90% of the federal poverty guidelines. The ACA Medicaid
expansion covers people with income below 138% of federal poverty guidelines. Critics
argue that the expansion will discourage people on the borderline of the new Medicaid
qualification to work since they might lose their healthcare benefits. In addition, the
ACA’s federal income subsidies require states to help individuals and small businesses to
purchase health insurance by limiting premium costs to between 2% and 9.5% of income
for those who earn between 133% and 400% of the federal poverty guidelines, respectively.
Garrett and Kaestner (2014) argue that the Affordable Care Act will likely cause a
decline in employment through voluntary choices of people to not work because of the
access to health insurance benefit rather than through the employer mandate. Garrett
and Kaestner (2014) predict that ACA Medicaid expansion will cause 165,000 fewer
people to work. In 2014, the Congressional budget Office (CBO) estimated that ACA
would result in 1.5% to 2.0% reduction in the number of hours worked by 2024 because
workers choose to supply less labor to qualify for Medicaid. The CBO also predicted
that the decline in the number of work hours will reflect a decline in the number of
full-time equivalent workers. Full-time workers are expected to decrease by 2 million by
2017, and by 2.5 million by 2024 (Congressional Budget Office, 2014). According to the
Congressional Budget Office (2014), total employment will increase in the next decade
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after the implementation of the ACA but the increase would be smaller than it would be
in absence of the ACA.
In contrast, Holahan and Garret (2011) argue that the reduction in labor supply, if
any, will be small and not as a result of the ACA. According to Holahan and Garret
(2011), since the unemployment rate in the U.S. remains high, if some workers decide
to reduce their labor supply or leave their jobs to pursue health insurance benefits from
Medicaid expansion or to get federal subsidies, other people seeking employment will
quickly fill the vacancies. In addition, under the ACA’s employer mandate, workers are
less incentivized to look for a job or stay in a job that offers health insurance when
they do not have comparative advantages for it. In order words, having the employer
mandate will help reduce job lock (Holahan and Garret, 2011; Pinkovskiy, 2015). A
number of existing studies also support Holahan and Garret (2011). Gooptu et al. (2016)
find that Medicaid does not cause any significant change in employment, job switching, or
reduction in work hours. Leung and Mas (2016) find that the Medicaid expansion under
the Affordable Care Act increased Medicaid coverage among American childless adults
by 3% but found no significant impact on employment. In an analysis of tax data linked
to labor supply by Kucko et al. (2017) find no evidence that workers reduce their work
hours or leave their jobs to get health insurance benefits. Gangopadhyaya and Garret
(2020) report an 7.8% increase in workers’ health insurance coverage from 2010 to 2016 as
the result of the ACA. and an 8% increase in the U.S. workforce, or 10.6 million workers,
between 2010 and 2016. Gangopadhyaya and Garret (2020) find no association between
changes in health insurance coverage rate within occupations and changes in employment
level, number of hours worked, or earnings. Moreover, Blumberg et al. (2014) find the
ACA reforms and the availability of Medicaid coverage reduces job lock and increases
self-employment and entrepreneurship in the U.S.
To estimate the effect of the ACA on the labor market, Pinkovskiy (2015) use the
fraction of people who were uninsured in each county as an approximation for the county’s
degree of exposure to the Affordable Care Act. According to Pinkovskiy (2015), counties
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with higher uninsured rates in 2013 (before the implementation of the ACA) are expected to be affected more heavily compared to counties with lower 2013 uninsured rates.
By comparing labor market outcomes between more exposed counties and less exposed
counties after the implementation of the ACA, Pinkovskiy (2015) find that counties with
higher uninsured rate before the implementation of the ACA experienced higher employment and salary growth compared to counties with lower uninsured rate prior to the
implementation of the ACA. Their result suggests that the ACA has a positive impact
on employment and the labor market.

3.3

Data

Since the goal of this study is to determine whether the ACA has an impact on employment, and whether firms responsed to ACA’s employer mandate by reducing their
workforce to below the 50-full-time-employee threshold, the labor market’s outcomes of
interest in this study are: [1] the annual total employment (in state and county levels),
[2] the annual total employment by firm size (in state level), [3] the shares of full-time
and part-time workers (in state and county levels), and [4] the shares of firms by firm
size (in state and county levels).
Annual total employment, annual employment by firm size, and the share of firms
by firm size are obtained from the County Business Pattern data (CBP) from United
States Census Bureau (2021). The data include the number of establishments registered
in individual states and counties and the total employment during the week of March
12 each year. Since I focus on market outcomes before and after the implementation of
the ACA in 2014, I only use the annual CBP data from 2010 to 2019. The CBP data
are available in the U.S. level, state level, and county level. The state level CBP data
include information on the numbers of establishments and workers registered by state,
the numbers of establishments and the numbers of workers by different firm sizes (1-4
employees, 5-9 employees, 10-19 employees, 20-49 employees, 50-99 employees, 100-249
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employees, 250-499 employees, 500-999 employees, and more than 1,000 employees). The
county level CBP data include the numbers of total workers by county and the numbers
of total establishments by firm size. The county level of the CBP data do not include the
numbers of workers by firm size.
From 2010 to 2019, the U.S. total workforce increased from 111,970,095 workers to
132,989,428 workers. By 2019, there are almost 8 million firms of all sizes in the U.S. On
average, firms with 1-4 employees account for 53% of all establishments, firms with 5-9
employees account for 18%, firms with 10-19 employees account for 13%, firms with 20-49
employees account for 8.5%, firms with 50-99 employees account for 3%, and businesses
with more than 100 employees account for the remaining 4.5% of all U.S. businesses2 .
Figure 3.1 presents the share of firms by size from 2008 to 2016. The trends suggest
that on average, the share of small businesses with 1-4 workers decreased over time but
the decreasing rate has been slower since 2013. The share of businesses with 5-9 workers
steadily decreased since 2013. The share of businesses with 20-49 workers increases over
time since 2011. The share of larger businesses of 50-99 workers, 100-249 workers, 250499 workers, 500-999 workers, and 1000 or more workers remains largely unchanged since
2010.

2

Note that there is a data input error in the numbers of firms with 1-4 employees in the CBP data in
2017, 2018, and 2019, which causes the number of small firms with 1-4 employees about 10 times smaller
than previous years while the total employment in these firms did not change. Hence, for the share of
firms by firm size, I only use data from 2010 to 2016.
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Figure 3.1: The Shares of Businesses by Size 2008 - 2016

(a) 1-4 employees

(b) 5-9 employees

(c) 10-19 employees

(d) 20-49 employees

(e) 50-99 employees

(f ) 100-249 employees

(g) 250-499 employees

(h) 500-999 employees

(i) More than 1000 employees
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The main independent variable of interest in this study is the fraction of people who
are between 18 and 64 years old, who earn less than 400% of the federal poverty line, and
are uninsured in 2013 (before the implementation of the ACA). These uninsured people
would be eligible for Medicaid or for the exchange subsidies under the ACA. According to
Pinkovskiy (2015), counties with lower uninsured rates before the implementation of the
ACA are less affected by the ACA’s regulations and mandates. States or counties with
higher uninsured rates prior to the implementation of the ACA are expected to be affected
more since the ACA mandates would cause a major change in existing firms’ health
insurance benefit policy. Furthermore, lower pre-ACA insured rates are expected to be
associated with higher numbers of people who would exchange their income for Medicaid
eligibility. The work incentives from this population is expected to be affected by the
ACA Medicaid eligibility and subsidies. Therefore, the uninsured rate among adults who
earn less than 400% of the poverty line in a county in 2013 is a good approximation for the
degree of exposure to the ACA. This method of approximating a state’s or county’s level
of exposure to a new policy has been previously employed by researchers. For example, to
study the effect of federal minimum wage increase, Card (1992) used the state’s fraction
of teens who earned less than the new federal minimum wage as the approximation for
state’s level of exposure to the new minimum wage policy. To study woman’s labor
supply, Acemoglu et al. (2004) used a state’s different World War II mobilization rate as
approximation for the shock to the female labor market during the 1940s.
The uninsured rate comes from the United States Census Bureau (2013) model-based
estimates of the Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE). Figures 3.2 and 3.3
present the 2013 uninsured rate by state and county, respectively. Before the implementation of the ACA, the uninsured rate among adults who earn less than 400% of the
poverty line was 20.5%. After implementation of the ACA, the uninsured rate dropped
significantly across the U.S. (Figure 3.4). Uninsured rates dropped to 16.7% in 2014, and
to 13.6% in 2019. Texas was the state with the highest uninsured rate before the implementation of the ACA. The uninsured rate in Texas was 32.2% in 2013 and it dropped
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to 28% in 2014 (Figure 3.5). Massachusetts was the state with the lowest uninsured
rate, 7% prior to the implementation of the ACA. After the implementation of the ACA,
the uninsured rate in Massachusetts dropped to 6% (Figure 3.5). Texas is expected to
be the state that is most exposed to the new ACA’s mandates while Massachusetts is
expected to be the least exposed to the ACA. Therefore, if the ACA has any impact on
employment or the share of businesses by size, I expect to see larger effects in states with
higher uninsured rate pre-ACA like Texas because there were substantial changes in the
coverage rates in these states after the ACA was signed into law.
The share of full-time and part-time workers by state and county and additional
control variables such as county level demographics are obtained from the Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS USA) (Ruggles et al., 2021) and the County Health
Ranking data (University of Wisconsin Population Health Institute, 2018). Since IPUMS
data only cover 1% of the U.S. population, it cannot over all 3,006 counties in the U.S.
Therefore, in this study, the number of county level observations in the analysis of fulltime workers is fewer than the number of county level observations in the analyses of
total employment and business market structure.
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Figure 3.2: Uninsured Rate in 2013 - State Level
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Figure 3.3: Uninsured Rate in 2008 - County Level
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Figure 3.4: Uninsured Rate from 2008 to 2019 - US Level

• The length of the box represents the interquartile range (the distance between the 25th and 75th
percentiles)
• The diamond in the box interior represents the group mean
• The horizontal line in the box interior represents the group median
• The vertical lines issuing from the box extend to the group minimum and maximum values
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Figure 3.5: Percentage of Uninsured People in Texas and Massachusett
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3.4
3.4.1

Empirical Approach
State Level

To visualize the effect of the ACA on the labor market outcomes and business structure,
I first perform a simple OLS estimation to examine the relationship between a state’s
uninsured rate in 2013, the degrees of exposure to the ACA, and the average annual labor
market outcomes for 2 periods: before and after implementation of the ACA. The labor
market outcomes of interest are: [1] average annual change in total state employment, [2]
average annual change in state employment by firm size, and [3] average annual change
in the share of firms by size. The estimated equations are:

∆Ȳs,t=0 = α + β × Us,2013

(3.1)

∆Ȳs,t=1 = α + β × Us,2013

(3.2)

where ∆Ȳs,t denotes the average annual change in labor market outcomes or business
structure outcomes in state s in period t, t = 0 represents the period before the implementation of the ACA (2010 - 2013), t = 1 represents the period after the implementation
of the ACA (2014 - 2019). Us,2013 denotes an uninsured rate among adults under 65 year
old and earn less than 400% of the poverty line in state s

3.4.2

County Level

Since the SAHIE data provides estimates of county level health insurance coverage in
the United States, it allows analyses to be performed at the county level, and individual
level. However, I choose to perform the analysis on the county level because of a couples
reasons. First, county level analysis is useful to capture the effect of the ACA on total
employment growth in small areas, from which we can gain insight on how many jobs were
created or harmed in these areas after the implementation of the ACA. Individual level
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analysis might provide information on how likely or less likely an individual is employed
in the post-ACA period. However, a micro level analysis does not provide insight on how
many jobs the ACA created or harmed. Second, county level analysis helps to capture the
change in the share of full-time employment if people were put into involuntary part-time
jobs as businesses cut costs in response to the ACA employer mandate. It is important
to understand if the ACA created any structural change in the labor market. This is why
it makes sense to analyze the data in an aggregated level rather than the individual level.
The ACA was implemented nationwide in 2014. Since the law affected all the U.S.
states and counties at the same time, there is not a non-treated group in the posttreatment period. Instead, because each county in the U.S. has a different level of exposure to the ACA based on how large or small their pre-ACA uninsured rate was, each
county experienced a different “dose” of the ACA treatment. In other words, the county
level pre-ACA uninsured rate can be viewed as the treatment intensity. This variation in
treatment intensity makes it possible to evaluate the effect of the ACA on labor market
outcomes.
To estimate the causal effect of the ACA on the labor market and business structure,
I employ the two way fixed effect difference-in-differences (DID) method with continuous
treatment to estimate the following equation.

Yc,t = α + δc + γt + σ × Uc,2013 × D2014 + β × Xc,t + ϵc,t

(3.3)

where Yc,t denotes the labor market or business structure outcome in county c in year t.
D2014 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for each year after 2014, the year of the implementation of the ACA. Uc,2013 denotes the uninsured rate among adults under 65 year old
and earn less than 400% of the poverty line in county c. Xc,t is a set of covariates for
county c in year t including demographic characteristics. δc are county fixed effects and
γt are year fixed effects. The coefficient of interest, σ, is the weighted sum of the average
treatment effect. σ measures the impact of differential exposure to the ACA on the labor
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market and business structure outcomes (De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2020),
Callaway et al. (2021)).
Callaway et al. (2021) noted that the average causal effect of a unit change in treatment intensity σ can include selection bias when there is selection into particular groups.
However, since the implementation of the ACA is a natural experiment and a region’s
level of exposure to the ACA is their pre-ACA uninsured rate, I argue that a region could
not choose to experience a different level of exposure. Hence, the average effect of a unit
change in intensity of exposure to the ACA captured should not include selection bias.
In the county level analysis, other control variables include a binary variable that indicates whether a state adopted Right-To-Work laws (RT W ), a binary variable that indicates whether a state expanded Medicaid in the 2014-2019 period (M edicaid − expand),
an interaction term between M edicaid − expand and the level of exposure to the ACA,
Uc,2013 .
As of 2013, RTW laws were adopted in 21 states. These laws guarantee that workers
have the right to join a union; however, no person is compelled to join a union or pay
union fee as a condition of employment. Critics of the law argue that RTW weakens
union bargaining power. Hence, in RTW states, firms arguably can fire of lay off workers
more easily compared to Non-RTW states where unions have stronger bargaining power.
Since the ACA employer mandate requires firms of 50 employees or more to contribute
to their employees’ health insurance benefit, it is easier for larger firms in RTW states to
reduce their size to save labor costs.
By 2019, 34 states including Washington D.C. expanded Medicaid while 17 states did
not. The states that did not expand Medicaid by 2019 include Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Indiana, and Utah. The Medicaid
expansion is argued to increase workers’ incentives to trade income for Medicaid benefits,
hence, reducing their labor supply. However, since Medicaid was expanded from only
covering people with income below 90% FPL to cover people with income below below
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138% FPL, ACA Medicaid expansion offers healthcare benefit to more people, who were
not eligible for Medicaid pre-ACA. Having healthcare can also improve health, thus,
increase employment by reducing the risk of job loss (Schuring et al. (2007), Butterworth
et al. (2012), Olesen et al. (2013), Schuring et al. (2013), Rijn et al. (2014)). Therefore, the
binary variable M edicaid − expand and an interaction term between M edicaid − expand
and pre-ACA uninsured rate are also included in the county level analysis of labor market
outcome.
A set of county demographic characteristics such as level of education attainment,
population, the share of female population, the share of White population, the share of
population under the age of 18, the share of population between 18 and 64 year old, the
share of population who are not proficient in English, and the share of rural area are
included in the county level analysis.

3.5
3.5.1

Results
State Level

The ACA and Total Employment
Figure 3.6(a) shows that on average, state employment increased by 1.53% annually from
2010 to 2013. Table 3.1 presents the estimates of β for equations 3.1 and 3.2. There is
not a relationship between 2013 uninsured rates and annual change in state employment
before the implementation of the ACA (Table 3.1). After the implementation of the
ACA, states with higher uninsured rates in 2013 experienced higher annual growth in
employment compared to states with lower uninsured rates in 2013 in post-ACA period
(Figure 3.6b). The estimate of β in equation 3.2 indicates that states with 1% higher
in uninsured rate in 2013 experienced 0.06% higher in annual employment growth in the
post ACA period (Table 3.1). This result suggests that states with more exposure to the
ACA experienced faster employment growth compared to states with less exposure to the
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ACA.
Figure 3.6: Effect of ACA on Total Employment (State Level)

(a) 2010-2013

(b) 2014-2019
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Table 3.1: Effect of ACA on Total Employment - State Level
Before ACA After ACA
(2010-2013) (2014-2019)
0.012
0.061**
(0.024)
(0.026)
No
No
51
51
0.005
0.101

2013 uninsured rate (%)
Includes demographic variables
N
R-squared

Note: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
The ACA and Employment by Firm Size
The results in the previous section suggest that the ACA had a positive effect on employment growth. In this section, I want to explore if the ACA had heterogeneous affects
across businesses of different sizes. Since small businesses with less than 100 employees benefit the most from the Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP), which
decreases their cost of health care premium contribution, I expect to see employment
for these businesses increase under the ACA. The results from estimating equations 3.1
and 3.2 separately for subsamples of firm size are presented in Table 3.2. The results
show that before the implementation of the ACA, there is no relationship between state
uninsured rates and annual employment growth regardless of businesses size (Table 3.2,
column 1). Under the ACA, small businesses of less than 100 workers in states with
higher exposure to the ACA experienced higher employment growth compared to their
counterparts in states with lower exposure to the ACA (Table 3.2, column 2). The magnitude of the increase in employment growth in states with more exposures to the ACA
range from 0.04% to 0.053%. Amongst these small businesses, the ACA has the biggest
positive effect on businesses with 50-99 employees. (Table 3.2, column 2).
Since 94% of medium-size businesses of 100-999 employees already offered health
insurance benefits to their employees in 2009 (Garrett and Buettgens, 2011), the impact
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of the ACA on these businesses is expected to be small. However, under the ACA’s
provisions, medium-sized businesses can save 0.5% on premium contributions (Garrett
and Buettgens, 2011). The results from Table 3.2 show that while the ACA does not
have an impact on businesses of 100-499 employees, it has a significantly positive impact
of 0.1% on businesses of 500-999 employees (Table 3.2, column 2).
Despite the fact that the ACA employer mandate increases labor costs for large businesses with 1000 employees or more (Holahan and Garret, 2011), the ACA does not have
any impact on employment for these large firms. (Table 3.2, column 2).
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Table 3.2: Effect of ACA on Employment by Firm Size - State Level

2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
N

(State Level)
Before ACA
After ACA
(A) Businesses with 1-4 employees
0.015
0.040**
(0.018)
(0.017)
0.014
0.097
(B) Businesses with 5-9 employees
0.026
0.042***
(0.021)
(0.0.015)
0.03
0.133
(C) Businesses with 9-19 employees
0.032
0.047**
(0.022)
(0.020)
0.04
0.10
(D) Businesses with 20-49 employees
0.023
0.052**
(0.024)
(0.023)
0.019
0.089
(E) Businesses with 50-99 employees
-0.007
0.053*
(0.030)
(0.029)
0.001
0.065
(F) Businesses with 100-249 employees
0.067
0.029
(0.040)
(0.036)
0.053
0.013
(G) Businesses with 250-499 employees
0.049
0.029
(0.063)
(0.04)
0.012
0.01
(H) Businesses with 500-999 employees
-0.12
0.106*
(0.088)
(0.054)
0.038
0.072
(I) Businesses with more than 1000 employees
-0.06
0.019
(0.10)
(0.011)
0.008
51

Note: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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0.006
51

The ACA and Business Structure
The results from estimating equations 3.1 and 3.2 separately for subsamples of the share
of firm by firm size are presented in Table 3.3. Te results indicate that there is not a
relationship between a state’s pre-ACA uninsured rate and the change in the shares of
firms by firms size, for both pre-ACA and post-ACA periods. The one exception is for
the share of firms with 250-499 workers. The results from Table 3.3 show that the in the
post-ACA period, the share of firms with 250-499 workers in states with higher exposure
to the ACA slightly decreased compared to states with less exposure to the ACA (Table
3.3, column 2). Specifically, the share of businesses of 250-499 employees in a state with
a 1% higher pre-ACA uninsured rate decreased by 0.0004%. Taken together the results
suggests that the ACA did not have a significant effect on business structure.
The results from the state level OLS analysis suggest that the ACA had a positive
impact on state total employment. States with a higher degree of exposure to the ACA
experienced higher rates of employment growth. The positive impact of the ACA on
employment growth is concentrated among smaller businesses of 100 workers or less and
businesses with 500-999 workers. At the state level, there is no clear evidence that the
ACA affected the market structure as measured by the shares of firms by firm size.
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Table 3.3: Effect of ACA on Business Structure - State Level

2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2013 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
N

(State Level)
Before ACA
After ACA
(A) Businesses with 1-4 employees
-0.0005
0.0008
(0.003)
(0.004)
0.0006
0.0007
(B) Businesses with 5-9 employees
0.0003
-0.00004
(0.002)
(0.002)
0.0004
0.0001
(C) Businesses with 9-19 employees
0.0002
-0.0002
(0.002)
(0.002)
0.01
0.0001
(D) Businesses with 20-49 employees
-0.0009
0.0004
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.009
0.002
(E) Businesses with 50-99 employees
-0.0008
-0.0002
(0.0006)
(0.0008)
0.004
0.0015
(F) Businesses with 100-249 employees
0.0004
-0.0003
(0.0004)
(0.0005)
0.018
0.008
(G) Businesses with 250-499 employees
0.00009
-0.0004**
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
0.0034
0.09
(H) Businesses with 500-999 employees
-0.00018
0.00007
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
0.04
0.009
(I) Businesses with more than 1000 employees
-0.00008
0.00003
(0.00006)
(0.00007)
0.03
51

Note: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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0.004
51

3.5.2

County Level

In county level analysis, I employ the difference-in-differences with continuous treatment
approach (Equation 3.3) to examine the effect of the ACA on: [1] total employment; [2]
the share of part-time and full-time workers; and [3] the share of firms by firm size. The
estimates of σ from Equation 3 measure the impact of differential exposure to the ACA
on labor market and business structure outcomes. The estimates of σ from Equation 3.3
are presented in Tables 3.4-3.73 .

The ACA and Total Employment
Table 3.44 shows the positive effect of the ACA on total employment5 . The result suggests
that, on average, a county with 1% higher in pre-ACA uninsured rate experienced a 0.04%
increase in employment growth in the post-ACA period. In other words, under the ACA,
counties with higher degrees of exposure to the ACA experienced higher employment
growth.

3

See full tables with other control variables in the Appendix
See full table with other control variables in the Appendix, Table C1
5
In the analysis on total employment, N=19,411 because the data sample covers all counties in the
US from 2010 to 2019.
4
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Table 3.4: Effect of ACA on Total Employment - County Level
County Level
(1)
Clustered SE
(on State)
2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

0.04**
(0.017)

(2)
Clustered SE
(on State and
Year)
0.04***
(0.013)

Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
Clustered on State
Clustered on Year
N

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
19,411

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
19,411

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level

The ACA and the Share of Full-time and Part-time Employment
Tables 3.56 and 3.6 shows that the ACA had a significant impact on the shares of fulltime and part-time workers7 . A county with 1% higher exposure to the ACA experienced
a 0.01% increase in the share of full-time workers and a 0.01% decrease in the share of
part-time workers in the post-ACA period. These results imply that businesses did not
respond to the ACA employer mandate by reducing full-time workers’ hours or laying off
full-time workers and hiring more part-time workers. Instead, the ACA had a positive
impact on full-time employment. Hence, there is no evidence to support the argument
that the ACA employer mandate kills jobs.

6

See full table with other control variables in the Appendix, Table C2
In the analysis on the shares of full-time and part-time worker, N=3,009 because the shares of fulltime and part-time workers were calculated from Micro Census Data, which does not cover all counties
in the US.
7
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Table 3.5: Effect of ACA on Full-time Employment - County Level
County Level
(1)
Clustered SE
(on State)
2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

0.01***
(0.003)

(2)
Clustered SE
(on State and
Year)
0.01**
(0.004)

Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
Clustered on State
Clustered on Year
N

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
3,009

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,009

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
Table 3.6: Effect of ACA on Part-time Employment - County Level
County Level
(1)
Clustered SE
(on State)
2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

-0.01***
(0.003)

(2)
Clustered SE
(on State and
Year)
-0.01**
(0.004)

Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
Clustered on State
Clustered on Year
N

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
3,009

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,009

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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The ACA and Business Structure
Table 3.78 shows the effect of the ACA on the business structure9 . Overall, the ACA did
not cause major changes in business structure. The ACA did cause a relatively small
increase in the share of firms with 5 to 9 workers and the share of business with 5-9
employees (Table 3.7, column 3). A county with 1% higher level of exposure to the
ACA experienced a modest gain of 0.0046% in the share of businesses with 5-9 people.
This result suggests that larger firms did not try to reduce their size to avoid paying the
additional cost in healthcare coverage or the fines.

8

See full tables with other control variables in the Appendix, Tables C3-C11
In the analysis on business structure, N=11,090 because CBP data from years 2017, 2018, 2019 were
excluded due to data error.
9
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Table 3.7: Effect of ACA on Business Structure - County Level

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

County Level
(1)
(2)
Clustered SE
Clustered SE
(on State)
(on State and Year)
(A) Businesses with 1-4 employees
-0.004
-0.004
(0.004)
(0.0038)

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

(B) Businesses with 5-9 employees
0.0046**
0.0046*
(0.0023)
(0.0025)

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

(C) Businesses with 9-19 employees
0.0013
0.0013
(0.0011)
(0.0015)

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

(D) Businesses with 20-49 employees
-0.0019
-0.0019
(0.002)
(0.0017)

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

(E) Businesses with 50-99 employees
0.00005
0.00005
(0.0001)
(0.0001)

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

(F) Businesses with 100-249 employees
-0.0005
-0.0005
(0.0004)
(0.00037)

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

(G) Businesses with 250-499 employees
0.00004
0.00004
(0.00018)
(0.00019)

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

(H) Businesses with 500-999 employees
0.0005
0.0005
(0.0006)
(0.0007)

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

(I) Businesses with 1000 employees or more
-0.000003
-0.000003
(0.00002)
(0.00004)

Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
Clustered on State
Clustered on Year
N
Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level

76

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
11,090
parentheses

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
11,090

3.6

Robustness Check

In my analysis, I have used states’ and counties’ adults uninsured rates in 2013 as approximation for the states’ and counties’ degrees of exposure to the ACA, respectively.
However, the rate of uninsured adults were stable in all states and counties in the period
before the implementation of the ACA (Figure 3.4). Even though the average uninsured
rate in 2010 was slightly higher than the average uninsured rate in 2013, the difference
was not significant (Figure 3.4). Therefore, to test the robustness of the the method and
the results, I will use states’ and counties’ adult uninsured rates in 2010 as approximation
for the degrees of exposure to the ACA. The estimations for state and county levels are
as follow:

State level estimation:
Ȳs,t=0 = α + β × Us,2010

(3.4)

Ȳs,t=1 = α + β × Us,2010

(3.5)

Yc,t = α + δs + γt + σ × Uc,2010 × D2014 + β × Xc,t + ϵc,t (6)

(3.6)

County level estimation:

State Level Results
Tables 3.8-3.10 present the effects of the ACA on employment growth, employment
growth by the firm size, and business structure, respectively. The results are robust to
using a state’s 2010 uninsured rate as an approximation for the degree of exposure to the
ACA. Specifically, the 2010 uninsured rate is associated with higher employment growth
in the post-ACA period. The higher growth in employment in the post-ACA period is
concentrated among small businesses with less than 100 employees and business with
500-999 employees. Amongst small business of 1-99 employees, the ACA has the biggest
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impact on businesses with 50-99 people. The ACA has a small negative impact on the
share of businesses with 250-499 people.

Table 3.8: Effect of ACA on Total Employment - Robustness Check, State Level
State Level
Before ACA After ACA
(2010-2013) (2014-2019)
0.01
0.066***
(0.02)
(0.024)
No
No
51
51
0.004
0.13

2010 uninsured rate (%)
Includes demographic variables
N
R-squared

Note: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table 3.9: Effect of ACA on Employment by Firm Size - Robustness Check, State Level

2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
N

(State Level)
Before ACA
After ACA
(A) Businesses with 1-4 employees
0.045**
0.042**
(0.018)
(0.016)
0.11
0.12
(B) Businesses with 5-9 employees
0.015
0.043**
(0.022)
(0.14)
0.01
0.16
(C) Businesses with 9-19 employees
0.020**
0.048**
(0.026)
(0.019)
0.01
0.12
(D) Businesses with 20-49 employees
0.021
0.058**
(0.030)
(0.021)
0.01
0.13
(E) Businesses with 50-99 employees
0.057
0.061**
(0.042)
(0.027)
0.04
0.09
(F) Businesses with 100-249 employees
0.083**
0.037
(0.036)
(0.034)
0.09
0.002
(G) Businesses with 250-499 employees
0.061
0.034
(0.069)
(0.039)
0.01
0.01
(H) Businesses with 500-999 employees
-0.24
0.101*
(0.106)
(0.051)
0.006
0.074
(I) Businesses with more than 1000 employees
0.057
0.034
(0.11)
(0.011)
0.008
51

Note: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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0.002
51

Table 3.10: Effect of ACA on Business Structure - Robustness Check, State Level

2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
2010 uninsured rate (%)

R-squared
N

State Level
Before ACA
After ACA
(A) Businesses with 1-4 employees
0.003
0.0006
(0.003)
(0.0038)
0.02
0.0005
(B) Businesses with 5-9 employees
0.0003
-0.00004
(0.002)
(0.002)
0.0004
0.0005
(C) Businesses with 9-19 employees
-0.0001
-0.0006
(0.0025)
(0.002)
0.00001
0.002
(D) Businesses with 20-49 employees
-0.0013
0.0009
(0.0015)
(0.001)
0.015
0.009
(E) Businesses with 50-99 employees
0.0006
-0.0002
(0.0008)
(0.0008)
0.011
0.00001
(F) Businesses with 100-249 employees
0.0005
-0.0003
(0.0004)
(0.0005)
0.025
0.005
(G) Businesses with 250-499 employees
0.0001
-0.0003*
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
0.0048
0.06
(H)Businesses with 500-999 employees
-0.0002
0.00008
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
0.05
0.01
(I) Businesses with more than 1000 employees
0.00004
0.00002
(0.00008)
(0.00007)
0.004
51

Note: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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0.002
51

County Level Results
Tables 3.11-3.13 present the impact of the ACA on county level employment growth,
the share of part-time workers, and business structure at county level, respectively. The
results are robust to using the county 2010 uninsured rate as an approximation for the
level of exposure to the ACA. Specifically, the ACA had a positive effect on the total jobs
and the share of full-time workers. The ACA had a modest positive impact on the share
of businesses of 5-9 employees but did not affect the share of businesses of other sizes.
Table 3.11: Effect of ACA on Total Employment - Robustness Check, County Level
County Level
DiD
2010 uninsured rate (%) × D2014
0.025*
(0.012)
Includes demographic variables
Yes
County F.E.
Yes
Year F.E.
Yes
Clustered SE on State and Year
Yes
N
19,411
Note: State-Year clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table 3.12: Effect of ACA on the Share of Full-time Employment - Robustness Check,
County Level
County Level
DiD
2010 uninsured rate (%) × D2014
0.0088*
(0.0046)
Includes demographic variables
Yes
County F.E.
Yes
Year F.E.
Yes
Clustered SE on State and Year
Yes
N
3,009
Note: State-year clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table 3.13: Effect of ACA on Business Structure - Robustness Check, County Level
County Level

2010 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

2010 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

2010 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

2010 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

2010 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

2010 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

2010 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

2010 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

2010 uninsured rate (%) × D2014
N
Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
Clustered SE on State and Year

(A) Businesses with 1-4 employees
-0.005
(0.004)
(B) Businesses with 5-9 employees
0.005**
(0.0024)
(C) Businesses with 10-19 employees
0.0015
(0.0013)
(D) Businesses with 20-49 employees
-0.002
(0.0014)
(E) Businesses with 50-99 employees
0.00005
(0.00009)
(F) Businesses with 100-249 employees
-0.0004
(0.0003)
(G) Businesses with 250-499 employees
0.00007
(0.0002)
(H) Businesses with 500-999 employees
0.0007
(0.0006)
(I) Businesses with more than 1000 employees
-0.00003
(0.00003)
11,090
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Note: State-year clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Discussion on the Reliability of DiD Apporach
Difference-in-differences methods often use many years of data and focus on outcomes that are highly serially correlated such as employment outcomes. As a result,
the estimated standard errors may understate the actual standard deviations of the DiD
estimators. The inconsistent standard errors lead to over rejection of the null-hypotheses
(Bertrand et al., 2004). In a study in 2004, Bertrand et al. (2004) use the same set of
census data to examine how DiD performs on random placebo laws, where treated states
and year of passage are chosen randomly. They found that the null of no effect is rejected
67.5% of time. Using clustered standard error at state-year level does help to reduce the
false rejection rate of the null, however, the false rejection rate is still as high as 43.5%.
A simpler and more efficient way to reduce the false rejection rate is to ignore the time
series information when computing standard errors (Bertrand et al., 2004). By ignoring
the time series information, the false rejection rate can be reduced to 5.3% (Bertrand
et al., 2004). To do this, one simply averages the data before and after the passage of law
and uses DiD estimation on this average outcome variable in the pre- and post- period,
that is, before and after the passage of the law. This method is appropriate to estimate
the treatment effect of laws that are passed at the same time for all treated states. Since
the ACA came in to effect at the same time nationwide, I employ this aggregating method
to test the robustness of the results from the county level analysis. Using the aggregating
method, the results from the county level analysis still hold. Specifically, there is a
statistically significant positive impact of the ACA on total employment (Table 3.14).
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Table 3.14: Effect of ACA on Total Employment, ignore time series information
County Level
2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014

Includes demographic variables
N
R-squared

0.03***
(0.009)
Yes
6,304
0.022

Note: Standard error is reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level

3.7

Conclusion

The combination of the state level analysis and the county level analysis suggests that
the ACA had a significant positive impact on total employment and the share of fulltime workers. The gain in employment in the period after the implementation of the
ACA is concentrated among small businesses with less than 100 workers and mid-size
businesses of 500-999 workers. The results are robust on both state and county levels.
Although the state level results suggest that the ACA has a small negative impact on
the share of medium businesses of 250-499 workers, the impacts are minimal and weakly
significant. These medium-size businesses did not experience any negative change in their
total employment.
My findings support the argument that the ACA actually helps small businesses by
providing incentives to provide their workers with healthcare insurance. The ACA provided small businesses with less than 100 workers the option of purchasing healthcare
coverage with a lower price; hence, they ended up saving more on health insurance
compared to the pre-ACA period. This could be a reason why we observe a gain in
employment for small businesses of less than 100 workers and a modest gain in the share
of small businesses of 5-9 employees.
Even though critics argue that the ACA employer mandate might cause a decrease
labor demand for firms with 50 or more employees, there is no evidence in this study
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that shows employers of these above-the-threshold businesses downsize or cut back on
their workers hours in response to the new mandate. In fact, I find that businesses of
50-99 employees, which are at the threshold, experienced the biggest positive impact in
employment growth compared to smaller size businesses. The result makes sense for a
couple of reasons. First, 94% of medium-size businesses of 100-999 people already offered
health insurance benefits to their workers in 2009 before the implementation of the ACA
(Garrett and Buettgens, 2011). In the pre-ACA period, workers might be reluctant
to switch to smaller employers because they might lose their health insurance benefits.
Second, under the ACA, businesses of 50-99 workers are now mandated to offer health
insurance benefits to their workers and have an option to purchase insurance at lower
prices through the Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP); hence, they can
offer health insurance at a lower cost compared to larger businesses. The ACA employer
mandate and SHOP help businesses of 50-99 to be more competitive in hiring and help
to reduce job lock. Under the ACA employer mandate, workers are able to switch jobs
to smaller size businesses more easily since they do not have to worry about losing their
healthcare benefits (Garrett and Buettgens (2011), Pinkovskiy (2015)).
In conclusion, the results from this study suggest that the ACA mandates have positive
impacts on total employment without obstructing the business structure. Moreover, the
healthcare reform benefits small businesses of less than 100 workers and has large positive
impacts on employment for these businesses. These small businesses are important since
they account for 95.5% of all establishments in the U.S. There is no evidence in this
study that suggests the ACA would kill jobs or put workers into involuntary part-time
employment.
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Appendix A
Figure A.1: Heat maps that represents county level percentage of ”Yes” votes, and maps
that represent counties with and without the presence of Davita’s and FMC’s clinics
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Figure A.2: Heat maps that represents county level percentage of ”Yes” votes, and heat
maps that represent prevalence to obesity and diabetes in each county
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Appendix B
After matching retirees to their working counterparts using the simple propensity score
matching method, we still see there are significant difference in health between retirees
and working individuals. In general, retirees are less healthy and are at higher risk
to experience health shocks in the past 2 years including cardiovascular diseases, lung
diseases, cancer, and diabetes (Table B.1).
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics after Simple Propensity Score Matching
Variables

Working

Retired

Difference

Retired
BMI (kg/m2)
Overweight
Obese
Age
Female
Education (years)
Health
Household’s capital income ($)
Total wealth ($)
Income ($)
GOV insurance
Private Insurance
Cadiovascular
Cancer
Diabetes
Lung
ADL limitation
Spouse’s health
Spouse cardiovascular
Spouse cancer
Spouse diabetes
Spouse lung
Spouse ADL limitation

100%
28.86
69.50%
35.38%
56.83
63.32%
12.63
2.9
10,485.00
275,661.00
19,605.00
24.53%
64.84%
17.95%
8.13%
16.86%
9.22%
26.96%
2.7
7.16%
3.11%
6.15%
3.00%
9.25%

0%
28.4
68.80%
32.74%
65.96
61.14%
12.33
2.86
12,720.00
344,750.00
10,629.00
63.37%
58.26%
25.13%
11.96%
22.18%
11.06%
16.66%
2.76
10.32%
4.96%
8.39%
3.46%
6.46%

100%***
0.46***
0.75%
2.64% ***
-9.13***
2.19%*
0.3***
0.04***
-2235***
-69088***
8975***
-38.84%***
6.58%***
-7.19%***
-3.83%***
-5.33%***
-1.84%***
10.30%***
-0.6***
-3.16%***
-1.85%***
-2.24%***
-0.46%***
2.8%***

N

24,208

24,208

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
* Significant at 10% level.
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Appendix C
Table C.1: Effect of ACA on total employment
(Full table for the results in Table 3.4, column 2)
County Level

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014
Medicaid Expand
2013 uninsured rate (%) × Medicaid Expand
RTW
Some college education (%)
Female (%)
White (%)
Population under 18 (%)
Population between 18 and 65

Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
N

Clustered SE
(on State and Year)
0.04***
(0.006)
-0.61*
(0.35)
0.003
(0.018)
-0.24
(0.14)
2.26**
(0.95)
1.13
(3.83)
0.96*
(0.54)
5.14**
(2.07)
0.06***
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
Yes
19,411

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table C.2: Effect of ACA on full-time employment
(Full table for the results in Table 3.5, column 2)
County Level

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014
Medicaid Expand
2013 uninsured rate (%) × Medicaid Expand
RTW
Some college education (%)
Female (%)
White (%)
Population under 18 (%)
Population between 18 and 65

Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
N

Clustered SE
(on State and Year)
0.01**
(0.004)
0.27
(0.28)
-0.016
(0.013)
-0.14
(0.10)
-0.61
(0.68)
1.51
(5.59)
0.45
(0.51)
0.22
(2.00)
0.02
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
Yes
19,411

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table C.3: Effect of ACA on the share of business of 1-4 employees
(Full table for the results in Table 3.7, column 2, panel A)
(County Level)

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014
Medicaid Expand
2013 uninsured rate (%) × Medicaid Expand
RTW
Some college education (%)
Female (%)
White (%)
Population under 18 (%)
Population between 18 and 65

Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
N

Clustered SE
(on State and Year)
-0.004
(0.0038)
-0.177
(0.134)
0.004
(0.007)
0.009
(0.06)
0.07
(0.34)
0.53
(1.37)
0.38
(0.26)
3.25***
(0.95)
0.007
(0.009)
Yes
Yes
Yes
19,411

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table C.4: Effect of ACA on the share of business of 5-9 employees
(Full table for the results in Table 3.7, column 2, panel B)
County Level

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014
Medicaid Expand
2013 uninsured rate (%) × Medicaid Expand
RTW
Some college education (%)
Female (%)
White (%)
Population under 18 (%)
Population between 18 and 65

Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
N

Clustered SE
(on State and Year)
0.0046*
(0.0025)
0.07
(0.11)
-0.0001
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.05)
0.12
(0.28)
0.39
(1.32)
-0.19
(0.17)
-1.21*
(0.65)
0.0001
(0.006)
Yes
Yes
Yes
19,411

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table C.5: Effect of ACA on the share of business of 10-19 employees
(Full table for the results in Table 3.7, column 2, panel C)
County Level

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014
Medicaid Expand
2013 uninsured rate (%) × Medicaid Expand
RTW
Some college education (%)
Female (%)
White (%)
Population under 18 (%)
Population between 18 and 65

Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
N

Clustered SE
(on State and Year)
0.0013
(0.0015)
0.12
(0.08)
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.025
(0.03)
-0.021
(0.17)
-1.52
(0.93)
-0.19
(0.12)
-1.19**
(0.56)
-0.009*
(0.005)
Yes
Yes
Yes
19,411

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table C.6: Effect of ACA on the share of business of 20-49 employees
(Full table for the results in Table 3.7, column 2, panel D)
County Level

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014
Medicaid Expand
2013 uninsured rate (%) × Medicaid Expand
RTW
Some college education (%)
Female (%)
White (%)
Population under 18 (%)
Population between 18 and 65

Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
N

Clustered SE
(on State and Year)
-0.0019
(0.0017)
-0.05
(0.06)
0.0014
(0.003)
0.015
(0.025)
0.18
(0.14)
0.13
(0.72)
0.015
(0.12)
-0.62*
(0.36)
-0.002
(0.003)
Yes
Yes
Yes
19,411

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table C.7: Effect of ACA on the share of business of 50-99 employees
(Full table for the results in Table 3.7, column 2, panel E)
County Level

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014
Medicaid Expand
2013 uninsured rate (%) × Medicaid Expand
RTW
Some college education (%)
Female (%)
White (%)
Population under 18 (%)
Population between 18 and 65

Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
N

Clustered SE
(on State and Year)
0.00005
(0.0001)
-0.017*
(0.009)
0.0007
(0.0005)
-0.0009
(0.002)
-0.022*
(0.011)
0.04
(0.10)
0.007
(0.01)
-0.005
(0.06)
-0.0001
(0.0004)
Yes
Yes
Yes
19,411

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table C.8: Effect of ACA on the share of business of 100-249 employees
(Full table for the results in Table 3.7, column 2, panel F)
County Level

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014
Medicaid Expand
2013 uninsured rate (%) × Medicaid Expand
RTW
Some college education (%)
Female (%)
White (%)
Population under 18 (%)
Population between 18 and 65

Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
N

Clustered SE
(on State and Year)
-0.0005
(0.00037)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.0003
(0.001)
-0.0017
(0.008)
0.01
(0.04)
-0.099
(0.27)
-0.036
(0.038)
0.021
(0.15)
-0.00007
(0.001)
Yes
Yes
Yes
19,411

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table C.9: Effect of ACA on the share of business of 250-499 employees
(Full table for the results in Table 3.7, column 2, panel G)
County Level

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014
Medicaid Expand
2013 uninsured rate (%) × Medicaid Expand
RTW
Some college education (%)
Female (%)
White (%)
Population under 18 (%)
Population between 18 and 65

Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
N

Clustered SE
(on State and Year)
0.00004
(0.00019)
0.018
(0.02)
-0.0006
(0.001)
0.0029
(0.0045)
0.02
(0.02)
0.23
(0.29)
-0.001
(0.02)
0.03
(0.08)
0.0006
(0.0005)
Yes
Yes
Yes
19,411

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table C.10: Effect of ACA on the share of business of 500-999 employees
(Full table for the results in Table 3.7, column 2, panel H)
County Level

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014
Medicaid Expand
2013 uninsured rate (%) × Medicaid Expand
RTW
Some college education (%)
Female (%)
White (%)
Population under 18 (%)
Population between 18 and 65

Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
N

Clustered SE
(on State and Year)
0.0005
(0.0007)
0.019
(0.039)
-0.0006
(0.002)
0.003
(0.012)
-0.12
(0.07)
0.28
(0.51)
0.013
(0.061)
-0.27
(0.24)
0.0029*
(0.0016)
Yes
Yes
Yes
19,411

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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Table C.11: Effect of ACA on the share of business of 1000 employees or more
(Full table for the results in Table 3.7, column 2, panel I)
County Level

2013 uninsured rate (%) × D2014
Medicaid Expand
2013 uninsured rate (%) × Medicaid Expand
RTW
Some college education (%)
Female (%)
White (%)
Population under 18 (%)
Population between 18 and 65

Includes demographic variables
County F.E.
Year F.E.
N

Clustered SE
(on State and Year)
-0.000003
(0.00004)
-0.0034
(0.0033)
0.0001
(0.00016)
-0.0004
(0.0007)
-0.0068*
(0.0037)
-0.0096
(0.023)
0.0026
(0.0035)
-0.007
(0.0014)
0.00008
(0.0001)
Yes
Yes
Yes
19,411

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
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